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The Effect of Enhancing Unemployment Benefits in Korea: 
Wage Replacement Rate vs. Maximum Benefit Duration† 
By JIWOON KIM* 
This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of an enhancement in 
unemployment benefits in Korea. In particular, I quantify the welfare 
effect of two specific policy chances which have been mainly discussed 
among policymakers in recent years: increasing wage replacement 
rates by 10%p and extending maximum benefit durations by one 
month. To this end, I build and calibrate an overlapping generation 
model which reflects the heterogeneity of the unemployed and the 
specificity of the unemployment insurance (UI) system in Korea. The 
quantitative analysis conducted here shows that extending maximum 
benefit durations by one month improves social welfare, whereas 
increasing wage replacement rates by 10%p deteriorates social 
welfare. Extending maximum benefit durations is applied to potentially 
all the UI recipients, including unemployed workers whose wage 
before job loss is relatively low and whose marginal utility is relatively 
high. However, increasing wage replacement rates is applied to only a 
small number of UI recipients whose wage before job loss is relatively 
high, while the increase in the UI premium is passed onto all of the 
employed. This study suggests that given the current UI system and 
economic environment in Korea, it is more desirable to extend 
maximum benefit durations rather than to increase wage replacement 
rates in terms of social welfare. 
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Wage Raplacement Rate, Maximum Benefit Duration 
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  I. Introduction 
 
he unemployment insurance (UI) system is becoming increasingly important as 
the unemployment rate is expected to increase given that the restructuring of 
Korea's main industries (shipbuilding, construction, steel industry, etc.) is ongoing
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and the dynamics of the Korean economy are need to be restored. Moreover, there 
has been a constant discussion that Korea’s UI system has lower wage replacement 
rates and shorter maximum benefit durations as compared to those of other OECD 
nations. The wage replacement rate is 50.5%, lower than the OECD average 
(64.5%) while the maximum benefit duration is seven months on average, 
amounting to only half of the OECD average of 15.1 months. In this situation, 
there is growing recognition that unemployment benefits
1
 should be enhanced in 
Korea among policymakers and researchers. This paper investigates the 
macroeconomic effects of enhancing unemployment benefits in Korea using the 
overlapping generation model, which reflects the heterogeneity of the unemployed 
and the details of the UI system in Korea. In particular, I focus on two specific 
policy chances which have been mainly discussed among policymakers in recent 
years: increasing wage replacement rates by 10%p and extending maximum benefit 
durations by one month. I quantify the effect of these policy changes on aggregate 
consumption, the employment rate, and social welfare using the calibrated 
overlapping generation model. 
Government support is needed for unemployment because unemployment is type 
of unexpected income shock, whereas there is no appropriate private insurance for 
unemployment risk due to the adverse selection problem. Consumption reduction 
resulting from unemployment not only reduces the welfare of the individual but 
also reduces the aggregate demand of the economy as a whole. Therefore, the 
government provides short-term income support on the premise of active job-seeking 
 
WAGE REPLACEMENT RATES IN 2014 (%)     MAXIMUM BENEFIT DURATIONS IN 2010 (MONTHS) 
 
   
 
FIGURE 1. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Note: 1) Wage replacement rates specify monthly after-tax wage replacement (unemployment benefit amount/average 
monthly wage) for the first month of benefit receipt. 2) Comparisons of recipients aged 40 with long and 
uninterrupted employment records. 3) The OECD average indicates the average of the OECD nations shown in the 
graphs. 4) It should be noted that Belgium imposes no limits on duration. Therefore, the OECD average does not 
include the value for Belgium. 
Source: Calculated by the author using OECD statistics and OECD (2011b).  
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In this paper, the terms ‘unemployment insurance’ and ‘unemployment benefits’ are interchangeable. 
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through UI that serves as public insurance. The enhanced unemployment benefits 
can help the unemployed to maintain their consumption level and promote social 
welfare (consumption smoothing effects). However, more generous unemployment 
benefits can also have a negative impact on job search efforts (moral hazard 
effects). In addition, enhanced unemployment benefits potentially raise the UI 
premium for all workers. Therefore, when analyzing the effects of UI policy 
changes, it is necessary to reflect the effects on social welfare in a balanced manner 
in consideration of the positive aspects (consumption smoothing effects) and the 
negative aspect (moral hazard effects and the increase in the UI premium) of 
enhanced unemployment benefits. 
In order to quantify the comprehensive effects of policy changes, I build an 
overlapping generation model which reflects the specificity of the UI system in 
Korea. In Korea, as of 2015, unemployment benefits are provided to involuntarily 
unemployed workers who have been in insurance-covered employment for at least 
180 days during an 18-month period before their job loss. They are given 50% of 
the average daily wage before severance for terms of 90 to 240 days. The 
maximum benefit duration varies depending on the age and number of insurance-
covered days of the worker (insured periods). The upper limit of the daily wage 
was set to 86,000 won, meaning that the upper limit of daily unemployment 
benefits is 43,000 won while the lower limit is 40,176 won—90% of the daily 
minimum wage (minimum wage × 8 hours).
2
  
The novel feature of the model in this paper is that it incorporates upper and 
lower limits of unemployment benefits and the maximum benefit duration 
depending on the age and insured period of each worker into the overlapping 
generation model. In addition, the eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits 
(involuntary unemployment and the minimum insured periods) are explicitly 
reflected in the model. Lastly, the model includes both workers who are covered by 
the UI and those who are not. As mentioned above, the application of unemployment 
benefits depends on the age and wage level immediately before the job loss. In 
addition, the effects of policy changes in the UI system are likely to vary among 
the unemployed given their different characteristics, such as different ages, income 
levels, and amounts of net assets. Therefore, the model reflects the heterogeneity of 
workers in terms of age, individual productivity, and the amount of net assets. 
The model is calibrated to match the key features of the Korean labor market, 
including labor market status by age group and various statistics related to the UI. 
Using the calibrated model, the overall effects of enhanced unemployment benefits 
in Korea are examined. In particular, this paper focuses on two specific policy 
chances: increasing wage replacement rates by 10%p and extending maximum 
durations by one month. These two polices are compared because they are 
currently being discussed as feasible policy options to enhance unemployment 
benefits considering the current actual situation in Korea, whereas the effects of the 
two policy changes differ greatly. Because the range of the unemployed workers 
who will be affected by the policy change differs considerably between the two 
policy changes, the relative sizes of the consumption smoothing effects and moral 
 
2
Minimum wages have rapidly increased over the past few years, even creating an inversion between the 
upper and lower limits in 2016. This was corrected recently via a revision of the Enforcement Decree of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act. 
4 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2018 
hazard effects can also be very different. In addition, because the increases in the 
UI premium to achieve the two policy options differ, all workers who are paying or 
will pay the UI premium can be affected to some extent. In sum, the two policy 
options affect the social welfare in different ways through consumption smoothing 
effects, moral hazard effects, and changes in the UI premium. In order to evaluate 
the overall effects of policy changes in a comprehensive manner, a structural model 
which reflects the heterogeneity of the unemployed and the specificity of the UI 
system in Korea is required.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the related literature and 
describes the contributions of this paper. Section III describes the overlapping 
generation model. Section IV presents the calibration of the model. Section V 
shows the results of a quantitative analysis of policy changes in unemployment 
benefits. Section VI concludes the paper and provides policy implications for the 
UI system in Korea. 
 
II. Related Literature 
 
Given that previous research on UI is vast and covers various topics, here I 
introduce relatively recent studies which are directly related to this paper. First, the 
empirical studies on consumption smoothing effects (one of the positive effects) 
and moral hazard effects (one of the negative effects) of unemployment benefits 
are reviewed.
3
 Then, quantitative studies which use structural models are 
introduced. Lastly, the contributions of this paper compared to those in previous 
works are briefly discussed. 
This paper is related to several strands in the literature on UI. With regard to the 
consumption smoothing effects of unemployment benefits, there are few related 
studies due to the small amount of penal data on consumption expenditures and the 
status of the labor market at the same time. Gruber (1997) first finds that a 10%p 
increase in the wage replacement rates of unemployment benefits reduces the 
reduction rate of consumption by 2.65%p in the U.S. using food expenditure data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 1987. This implies 
that unemployment benefits actually help unemployed smooth consumption levels 
during periods of unemployment. East and Kuka (2015) estimate consumption 
smoothing effects using the same methodology and data used by Gruber (1997) 
except that the range of data is from 1986 to 2011. Their estimate of the 
consumption smoothing effect is 1.0%p, which is weaker than that in Gruber 
(1997) at 2.65%p. The reason for the lower estimate is that the consumption 
smoothing effect declined between 1988 and 2011, mainly because unemployment 
benefits became less generous starting in the 1990s. Moreover, the consumption 
smoothing effect tends to be relatively small during shallow economic downturns 
 
3
In this paper, I focus on the positive and negative effects of unemployment benefits, which were found to be 
most important in empirical studies. In terms of positive effects other than consumption smoothing effects, 
unemployment benefits can help the unemployed find a better job (match quality effects) or help them to stay in 
the labor market (entitlement effects). In terms of negative effects other than the moral hazard effect, more 
generous unemployment benefits may reduce incentives for firm to hire workers due to the higher wage resulting 
from the higher value of unemployment as noted in Hagedorn et al. (2016). 
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which are more prominent in the samples after 1988. Browning and Crossley 
(2001) in a Canadian study estimate the consumption smoothing effect using data 
on total expenditures from 1993 to 1995. Their estimate of the consumption 
smoothing effect is 0.8%p, much smaller than that in Gruber (1997) at 4%p, which 
was adjusted for total expenditures.
4
 The difference can be interpreted as 
stemming from differences in the countries, sample compositions and estimation 
methods used. In particular, unlike the other studies mentioned above, only those 
unemployed for relatively lengthy periods, i.e., for four to nine months, were 
included in their analysis. The low estimate of Browning and Crossley (2001) 
suggests that the consumption smoothing effect can be reduced over time after a 
job loss. In Korea, Kim (2016) estimates the consumption smoothing effect for the 
period of 1999-2014 using total expenditure data from the Korean Labor and 
Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and a methodology similar to that by Gruber (1997). 
Kim’s (2016) estimate of the consumption smoothing effect in Korea is 4%p, 
similar to Gruber’s (1997) estimate adjusted for total expenditures. 
Unlike research on consumption smoothing effects, there are a large number of 
studies on the moral hazard effects of unemployment benefits. Moral hazard in this 
case refers to how long unemployment benefits extend the unemployment period.
5
 
Theoretically, more generous unemployment benefits may increase the reservation 
wages of the unemployed, thereby lowering incentives for the unemployed to seek 
jobs actively and thus resulting in longer unemployment periods. Although there 
are some differences in magnitudes, more generous unemployment benefits appear 
to lead to longer unemployment periods in most previous empirical studies. 
According to Tatsiramos and Ours (2014), who summarize the empirical results of 
studies conducted in various countries, unemployment periods increase by 
0.4~1.6% when the wage replacement rate increases by 1%p, and unemployment 
periods are extended by 0.04~0.18 weeks when the maximum benefit duration 
increases by one week. As in other countries, most of the earlier studies in Korea 
have concluded that the more generous unemployment benefits increase the 
unemployment period (e.g., Kim et al. (2007), Yoon and Lee (2010)). However, a 
few recent studies have reported that there is no significant positive relationship 
between the generosity of unemployment benefits and the unemployment period 
(Kim and Yoon (2014), Cheon et al. (2014)). 
Based on the literature discussed thus far in this study, it is highly likely that 
both positive and negative effects will occur when unemployment benefits become 
more generous. Accordingly, several studies have investigated the optimal level of 
unemployment benefits in order to maximize the positive effect and minimize the 
negative effect. Considering both effects, Chetty (2008) finds that the current UI 
system in the U.S., where the wage replacement rate is 50% and the maximum 
 
4
Browning and Crossley (2001) convert Gruber’s (1997) estimate of food expenditures into that of total 
expenditures based on a few assumptions regarding the relationship between food and total expenditures.  
5According to Chetty (2008), some part of the increase in the unemployment period due to more generous 
unemployment benefits occurs as a positive effect of the provision of liquidity. Although unemployment periods 
become longer, the receipt of unemployment benefits can help the unemployed to find better jobs due to the 
provision of liquidity from unemployment benefits. In this sense, the increase in unemployment periods cannot be 
interpreted solely as a result of the moral hazard effect. However, according to Tatsiramos (2014), who 
summarized the latest empirical results on the effect of unemployment benefits on the quality of reemployment 
jobs, there is no significant effect of improving job quality in most cases.  
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benefit duration is six months, is close to the optimal level. Michelacci and Ruffo 
(2015) show that the younger the unemployed, the greater the positive effect of 
unemployment benefits and the smaller the negative effect. These results suggest 
that it is optimal to provide more generous unemployment benefits to the 
unemployed who are younger. With regard to for Korea, Chun (2009) derives the 
optimal structure of the UI system in Korea using the overlapping generation 
model based on the life cycle model of Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992). He finds 
that the optimal wage replacement rate is 60% and that the optimal level of the 
upper limit for monthly UI benefits is 80% of the average wage before job loss. 
In recent years, there have been a growing number of studies quantifying the 
macroeconomic effects of policy changes in UI systems on production, 
employment, consumption, and welfare using search and matching models. 
Nakajima (2012) analyzes the impact of the extension of the maximum benefit 
duration on the Great Recession in the U.S. Approximately 1.4%p, which amounts 
to 30% of the total increase in the unemployment rate during the recession, was 
attributed to the extension of the maximum benefit duration. Faig and Zhang (2016) 
investigate the effect of Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program, 
which allowed an extension of the maximum benefit duration in 2008 up to 99 
weeks in the U.S. Their analysis shows that the EUC program increased the 
unemployment rate by 0.5%p. In Korea, Moon (2010) examines the effect of 
changes in the maximum benefit duration on labor markets through a three-state 
search and matching model. He finds that when non-participants are not taken into 
consideration in the model, an extension of the maximum benefit duration does not 
have a significant effect on the increase in the unemployment rate. However, when 
non-participants are included in the model, the extension leads to an increase in the 
unemployment rate. Hong (2010) quantifies the effect of more generous 
unemployment benefits on job search efforts, the employment rate, and economic 
welfare. He finds that an increase in the wage replacement rate has little impact on 
job search efforts and welfare, whereas an extension of the maximum benefit 
duration has a significant impact on job search efforts and welfare. 
As noted above, a few studies in Korea have already examined the impact of 
unemployment benefits on the labor market and social welfare. The main 
differences between this study and previous studies are as follows. In terms of the 
topic, this paper quantifies the comprehensive effects of two specific policy 
changes in the UI system in Korea. I explicitly consider that the relative sizes of the 
positive and negative effects of the enhanced unemployment benefits can differ 
between the two policy changes because the ranges of unemployed workers 
affected by the two policy changes differ considerably. In other studies, however, 
these different effects may not be suitably reflected because either the specificity of 
the UI system in Korea is not fully modeled or the heterogeneity of the 
unemployed worker is not sufficiently considered. In terms of the model, the 
overlapping generation model in this paper reflects the details of the UI system in 
Korea and the heterogeneity of the unemployed workers so as more precisely to 
quantify the effects of the policy changes. In particular, the model includes the two 
eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits (involuntary unemployment and 
the minimum insured period), the method by which the maximum benefit duration 
is determined (depending on age and the insured periods), and the lower and upper 
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limits of the monthly unemployment benefit. It also reflects the heterogeneity of 
the unemployed in terms of age, insured period, individual productivity, and the 
amount of net assets considering that the consumption smoothing effects and moral 
hazard effects may appear differently among different types of unemployed.  
 
III. Model 
 
The model explicitly reflects the heterogeneity of age, individual productivity 
(skill), amount of net assets, and other factors, considering that the effects of policy 
changes in the UI system vary with the heterogeneity of the unemployed. The 
overlapping generation model in this paper is built based on Kitao (2014).
6
  
 
A. Environment 
 
Population 
 
The period in the model is one month.
7
 The model economy consists of a 
continuum of risk-averse workers. The measure of workers is normalized to one. 
There are J  age groups. Workers face stochastic life spans in the sense that 
workers belonging to age group 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, ⋯ , 𝐽} in the current period transition to 
age group 𝑗 + 1 in the next period with a certain probability denoted by 𝜙𝑗 .
8,9
 
Workers face mortality risk every period, and the probability of surviving until the 
next period for workers belonging to age group 𝑗 is denoted by 𝜌𝑗 . 
It is assumed that the remaining assets of the deceased workers at the end of the 
preceding period are inherited and redistributed equally to all workers in the 
economy at the beginning of the next period. The amount of these bequests is 
denoted by x .10 The size of worker group newly entering the economy (age group 
0) is identical to that of the deceased workers every period such that the total 
population remains at one. The skill distribution of the new entrants is assumed to 
be identical to that of the deceased workers, implying therefore that the skill 
distribution of the entire economy remains the same.  
 
6
The model in Kitao (2014) was originally designed to analyze disability insurance in the United States. I 
refer to the model in Kitao (2014) because the main ingredients of the model such as labor markets and age 
structures are suitable for analyzing UI in Korea. 
7
In previous policy changes, the maximum benefit duration had been adjusted by one month. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to assume that the period of the model is to be one month considering the actual situation in Korea.  
8
The transition probability for the last age group 𝐽 (𝜙𝐽) is assumed to be 0. 
9
It is necessary to reflect the age structure of the UI system in Korea, in which the maximum benefit duration 
depends on age. Ideally, I can assume an age structure of one year, but given that the model period is one month 
and the model has heterogeneity in various dimensions, the assumption that the age increases stochastically 
reduces the complexity of the model and the burden of the computation greatly.    
10
These are also referred to as accidental bequests in the literature.  
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Labor Market 
 
The economy is composed of the employed ( E ), the unemployed (U ), and the 
retired ( R ). The retirement age in the model is denoted by 𝑗𝑅. If the index for the 
age group ( j ) is greater than or equal to the retirement age (𝑗𝑅), then workers are 
classified as non-participants. Workers whose index for the age group does not 
reach the retirement age are classified as either employed or unemployed. 
Therefore, all non-participants in this model are retirees.
11
 Workers have different 
skill levels (𝑔𝑗 ∈ [𝑔𝑗, 𝑔𝑗]) which depends on age, and the skill levels do not 
change over time within the same age group. When the age group changes 
stochastically, the absolute value of the skill level changes though the same decile 
is retained within the age group. 
Employed workers work for a fixed amount of hours and earn labor incomes 
(𝑔𝑗𝑤) which depend on the skill levels of the worker. 𝑤  denotes the monthly 
wage for the efficiency unit of the labor supply. The wage rate is assumed to be 
exogenously given together with the interest rate because the model is a partial 
equilibrium model. Monthly work hours are constant over time and are normalized 
to one.
12
 Every employed worker can be involuntarily separated with exogenous 
probability 𝜒  at the end of each period. When employed workers have not 
experienced involuntary unemployment, they quit voluntarily with probability 𝑞.13 
The unemployed workers choose the level of job search efforts (𝑠 ∈ [0,1]) at the 
beginning of each period. Given that a firm’s decision on job postings is not 
explicitly modeled, the job finding probability by age group (𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠)) depends only 
on the job search efforts of the unemployed. The greater the job search efforts of 
the unemployed, the greater the job finding probability. Although firms are not 
explicitly considered, it is assumed that the   proportion of firms is covered by 
UI and the 1 − 𝜆 proportion of firms is not. Therefore, for the unemployed who 
are looking for a job, the probability meeting a firm covered by UI is  . When a 
worker works at a firm covered by UI, the insured period (𝑘) for the worker 
stochastically increases according to the transition probability matrix 𝛱(𝑘, 𝑘′). 
Retirees neither work nor find jobs as non-participants. 
 
Unemployment Insurance 
 
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, the following two conditions must be 
met: 1) the unemployment should be involuntary, and 2) the insured period (𝑘) is 
greater than the minimum insured period (𝑘𝑒). During the next period of job loss, 
the unemployed who are eligible for benefits can decide whether or not to apply for 
unemployment benefits. If they apply for unemployment benefits, they receive 
 
11For the calibration, statistics related to the labor market such as employment rate and unemployment rate 
are also adjusted to match the assumptions in the model. 
12
In the case of the Korean labor market, I think this is a reasonable assumption considering that adjustments 
to working hours are not flexible. 
13
Voluntary unemployment refers to a shift to a better job and a resignation due to personal circumstances 
such as personal or family issues, dissatisfaction with the current job. This model includes all  types of voluntary 
unemployment in a reduced form.  
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these benefits from the period of application without rejections.
14
 The monthly 
unemployment benefits (𝑏) can be paid up to the maximum benefit duration (𝑑). 
The amount of the monthly unemployment benefit is determined based on the 
average wage
15
 before job loss and the maximum benefit duration depends on the 
age group and the insured period. Details about the amount of the monthly benefit 
and the maximum benefit duration are presented in the calibration section. Lastly, 
to simplify the model, when the unemployed have not applied for unemployment 
benefits, it is assumed that they do not have an opportunity to apply thereafter.
16
 
 
B. Worker’s Problem 
 
The individual state variables for a worker, whose labor market status is divided 
into the employed ( E ), the unemployed (U ), and the retired ( R ), are represented 
by (𝑗, 𝑎, 𝑘, 𝑖, 𝑑), 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, ⋯ , 𝐽} denotes the index for age groups and a  denotes 
the amount of net assets. 𝑘 ∈ {𝑘1 , 𝑘2, ⋯ , 𝑘𝐾} indicates the insured period for UI 
and 𝑖 ∈ {0,1} indicates whether or not an application is made for unemployment 
benefits. Lastly, 𝑑 ∈ {𝑑1, 𝑑2, ⋯ , 𝑑𝐷} denotes the number of months for which 
unemployment benefits are paid up until the current month. Unlike individual state 
variables which vary with time, an individual’s skill level (𝑔𝑗) is age dependent 
and does not change over time within the same age group. When the age group 
changes stochastically, the absolute value of the skill level changes while retaining 
the same decile within the age group.
17 
 
The Employed Worker ( Rj j ) 
 
The value function for an employed worker whose skill level is 
jg  and work at 
a firm which is covered by UI is expressed as shown below.  
 
14
In reality, the waiting period is seven days. 
15
In the current UI system in Korea, the average monthly wage level is determined by the average three-
month wage immediately before the job loss. Because the monthly wage level in the model is assumed to be the 
skill level of the workers, which is constant within the same age group, the average three-month wage is identical 
to the skill level of the workers. However, in the case of a stochastic change in the age group, the skill level also 
changes. Therefore, in the first few months after the change in the age group, the calculation of the average three-
month wage becomes more complicated. In this case, the wage level for the previous age group is used for the 
calculation of the average three-month wage for the sake of simplicity. 
16
In the current UI system in Korea, the unemployed can apply for the benefits at any time within one year 
after their job loss. Given that the average time to apply is 29.7 days after the job loss based on the 2015 Yearly 
Statistics of Employment Insurance (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2016a), the assumption that an 
application for the benefits is allowed only the month after they lose their jobs in the model seems innocuous. 
17In this model, similar to Mukoyama (2013), I focus on unemployment risk and conduct a welfare analysis 
related to the role of UI for unemployment risk. I do not take into account idiosyncratic earning shocks as in  the 
types of models following Aiyagari (1994). If the role of precautionary savings of the employed workers is 
important and the wage distribution or inequality itself is the main object of the paper, abstracting from time-
varying productivity shocks can be an inappropriate assumption. However, considering the purpose of the paper, 
the most important income risk here is unemployment risk. Therefore, the disadvantages that come from not 
reflecting idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks are not likely to be large. 
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At the beginning of each period, the employed worker observes his individual 
state variables and chooses the amount of consumption ( c ) and net assets ( a ) to 
maximize utility (𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙)) from consumption and leisure ( l )18 under a given budget 
constraint. The employed worker allocates their total income, which consists of 
after-tax labor income,
19
 after-tax asset income, redistribution ( x ) from deceased 
workers, and transfer income from the government ( T ), to consumption and 
savings (𝑎′).𝜏𝑐 , 𝜏𝑙 , 𝜏𝑘 and 𝜏𝑢 denote the consumption tax rate,
20
 the labor income 
tax rate, the asset income tax rate, and the UI premium, respectively. Because the 
worker is employed by a firm covered by UI, the worker’s insured period increases 
stochastically according to the transition probability matrix 𝛱(𝑘, 𝑘′). All workers, 
including employed workers, cannot borrow more than a . 
At the end of each period, the employed worker who continues to survive with 
probability 𝜌𝑗  makes the following decision. If the worker does not experience 
involuntary unemployment, he works at the same firm with probability 1 − 𝑞 or 
quits voluntarily with probability 𝑞.21 If the worker quits voluntarily, then he 
becomes an unemployed worker who is not eligible for unemployment benefits and 
looks for other jobs without unemployment benefits. 
,0
j
U
g
V  indicates the value 
function for the unemployed who are not eligible for unemployment benefits. 
If a worker experiences involuntary unemployment, the worker becomes an 
 
18
When engaged in work, the amount of leisure is 0, and when not working, leisure is normalized to one. 
19
Because the UI premium is subject to income deduction, labor income excluding the UI premium is 
regarded as the taxable income subject to the labor income tax. 
20
This corresponds to the value-added tax (VAT) rate in Korea. 
21
Voluntary unemployment is modeling in a reduced form because doing so enables the distribution of the 
voluntary unemployed and the involuntary unemployed in the model to be equal to the distribution in the actual 
data in a simple way. Voluntary unemployment can occur when productivity (wage) at the current job has fallen 
below the value of unemployment while the value of unemployment remains unchanged. On the other hand, 
voluntary unemployment can also transpire when the value of unemployment increases for reasons such as 
personal or family issues arising while productivity at the current job remains unchanged. In both cases, voluntary 
unemployment occurs when productivity or the market wage at the current job is lower than the reservation wage, 
which depends on the value of unemployment. In order to model the two types of voluntary unemployment 
observed in the data properly, both the change in productivity and the value of unemployment should be 
simultaneously internalized in the model. However, this is not an easy task and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
With regard to why voluntary unemployment is introduced in this paper, it should be noted that having a realistic 
share of voluntary unemployment is more important than an endogenous choice for voluntary unemployment. For 
this reason, I abstract from endogenous voluntary unemployment, and voluntary unemployment is modeled as an 
exogenous random separation despite the fact that this may not be consistent with the reservation wage theory.  
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unemployed worker and can apply for unemployment benefits depending on 
whether his insured period (𝑘) is greater than or equal to the minimum insured 
period (𝑘𝑒 ), which is one of the two eligibility conditions for unemployment 
benefits. 𝐼(𝑘<𝑘𝑒)  and 𝐼(𝑘≥𝑘𝑒)  are indicator functions showing whether the 
unemployed meet the eligibility condition related to the insured period. 
,1
j
U
g
V  
denotes the value function for the unemployed who are eligible for unemployment 
benefits. The expression on the last line of the constraints defines value functions 
for employed workers who will reach retirement age (𝑗𝑅) in the next period. 
The value function for an employed worker whose skill level is 𝑔𝑗  and who 
works at a firm not covered by UI is as follows: 
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One difference from the value function for an employed worker who works at a 
firm covered by UI is that the worker’s insured period does not increase and is 
fixed at the current level. Another difference is that the employed worker does not 
pay the UI premium, which is reflected in the budget constraint.
22
 
 
The Unemployed Worker ( Rj j ) 
 
The unemployed who quit voluntarily or who do not meet the eligibility 
condition for the minimum insured period ( 𝑘 < 𝑘𝑒 ) are not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. The value function for the unemployed who are not 
eligible for unemployment benefits is as follows: 
 
 
22Even if a worker’s current job is not covered by UI, the worker can apply for UI benefits if the worker 
meets the 180-day contribution requirement at the previous job and the worker is involuntarily separated from both 
the current and previous jobs. The model also allows for this possibility. Because the model does not keep track of 
all histories of the reasons for unemployment, the worker can apply for UI benefits in the model if the worker 
meets the 180-day contribution requirement at the previous job and the worker is involuntarily separated only from 
the current job regardless of the reason for the unemployment at the previous job. Therefore, it should be noted 
that there may be some imprecision regarding this simplification. 
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At the beginning of each period, the unemployed workers who are not eligible 
for unemployment benefits observes their individual state variables and chooses the 
amount of consumption and net assets, as well as the level of job search effort ( s ) 
to maximize the total utility from consumption and leisure minus disutility from the  
job search effort (𝑣(𝑠)) under the given budget constraint. It is assumed that the 
higher the level of job search effort is, the greater the disutility is from the job 
search. 
In this economy, the proportion 𝜆 of firms are covered by UI and the proportion 
1 − 𝜆 of firms are not. Therefore, the unemployed find a firm covered by UI with 
probability   and find a firm not covered by UI with probability 1 − 𝜆.23 At the 
end of each period, the surviving unemployed workers who find job with 
probability 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠) make the following decisions after observing their individual 
state variables. They can either work at a firm or refuse the offer and continue to 
look for other jobs during the next period. The unemployed workers who do not 
find jobs with probability 1 − 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠) continue to look for jobs. 
The unemployed who quit involuntarily and meet the eligibility condition for the 
insured period (𝑘 ≥ 𝑘𝑒) are eligible for unemployment benefits. The value function 
immediately after job loss for the unemployed who are eligible for unemployment 
benefits is as follows: 
 
 
23
Random matching with different types of firms may be distant from reality because some unemployed may 
want only firms covered by UI or only firms not covered by UI. In this paper, although the unemployed receive job 
offers from both types of firms with some probabilities, they can decide whether or not to accept a specific job 
offer. The unemployed can refuse the job offer when they want to wait for other job offers in the next period. In 
this sense, the choice of the unemployed between a firm covered by UI and a firm not covered by UI is not a 
completely random decision, as in a case of the exogenous voluntary separation (𝑞). Of course, in reality, each 
unemployed worker has a different probability of receiving a job offer from a particular type of firms. In this 
regard, the model still does not reflect reality because the same probability of receiving a job offer (𝜆 or 1 − 𝜆) 
is applied to all types of unemployed in the model. Given that having a realistic share of firms covered by UI in a 
steady state is of primary importance, the heterogeneity of the job offer probability is not reflected in the model for 
the sake of simplicity. 
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At the beginning of the period right after the job loss, the unemployed workers 
who are eligible for unemployment benefits observe their individual state variables 
and choose the amount of consumption and net assets, the level of the job search 
effort, and whether or not to apply for unemployment benefits (𝑖 ∈ {0,1}) to 
maximize the total utility from consumption and leisure minus the sum of the 
disutility from the job search effort and the disutility from the application process 
for unemployment benefits ( ) under the given budget constraint. The unemployed 
who apply for unemployment benefits can receive monthly unemployment benefits 
(𝑏(𝑔𝑗)), which depend on their skill level up to the maximum benefit duration 
(𝑑(𝑗, 𝑘)), which depends on each worker’s age group and insured period. If the 
unemployed apply for unemployment benefits, they receive benefits from the 
period of application without rejection, as was assumed previously. 
At the end of each period, the surviving unemployed workers who find jobs with 
probability 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠) make the following decisions after observing their individual 
state variables. They can either work at a firm or refuse an offer and continue to 
look for other jobs during the next period. It is assumed that even if a worker 
rejects a job offer, the worker can continue to receive unemployment benefits in 
consideration of the realistic situation.
24
 The unemployed worker who does not 
find a job with probability 1 − 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠)  continues to look for jobs. If the 
unemployed worker applies for unemployment benefits, then he receives the 
benefits. 
,2
j
U
g
V  denotes the value function for the unemployed who receive UI 
 
24
In current UI system in Korea, if a legitimate job offer is rejected by a recipient of unemployment benefits, a 
job center initially gives a written warning. In the case of a second refusal for a job offer, the job center may 
suspend unemployment benefits. However, this usually occurs if the unemployed reject a job offered by the job 
center, whereas in other cases most job offers are likely not to be affected by this rule. Because job offers are 
private information, even if the unemployed reject a job offer, it is difficult for the job center to observe this in 
reality.  
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benefits for more than or equal to two months. If the unemployed have not applied 
for unemployment benefits, it is assumed that they do not have an opportunity to 
apply thereafter as was assumed previously. 
The value function for the unemployed who have not exhausted their maximum 
benefit durations (the number of months actually paid (𝑑) < the maximum benefit 
duration (𝑑(𝑗, 𝑘)) is as follows: 
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At the end of each period, the surviving unemployed workers who find a job 
with probability 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠)  make the following decisions after observing their 
individual state variables. They can either work at a firm or refuse an offer and 
continue to look for other jobs during the next period. Even if a worker rejects a 
job offer, the worker can continue to receive unemployment benefits. The 
unemployed worker who does not find a job with probability 1 − 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠) 
continues to look for jobs while receiving unemployment benefits. 
The value function for the unemployed who are receiving unemployment 
benefits in the last month (the number of months actually paid (𝑑) = the maximum 
benefit duration (𝑑(𝑗, 𝑘))) is as follows: 
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At the end of each period, the surviving unemployed workers who find a job 
with probability 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠)  make the following decisions after observing their 
individual state variables. They can either work at a firm or refuse an offer and 
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continue to look for other jobs without unemployment benefits in the next period. 
The unemployed worker who does not find a job with probability 1 − 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠) 
continues to look for jobs without unemployment benefits because he has 
exhausted the maximum benefit duration. 
 
The Retired Worker ( Rj j ) 
 
The Value function for a retired worker is as follows: 
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At the beginning of each period, the retired worker (𝑗 ≥ 𝑗𝑅 ) observes his 
individual state variables and chooses the amount of consumption and net assets to 
maximize the utility from consumption and leisure under the given budget 
constraint. Because the decisions of retired workers are independent of the skill 
level (𝑔𝑗), there is no subscript in the value function for the retired worker. 
 
C. Stationary Recursive Equilibrium 
 
I define an individual state vector of the employed working at a firm not covered by 
UI, the employed working at a firm covered by UI, the unemployed not collecting 
unemployment benefits, the unemployed collecting unemployment benefits, and 
the retired as 𝑠𝐸,0 = (𝑗, 𝑎, 𝑘; 𝑔𝑗) , 𝑠𝐸,1 = (𝑗, 𝑎, 𝑘; 𝑔𝑗) , 𝑠𝑈,0 = (𝑗, 𝑎, 𝑘; 𝑔𝑗) , 
𝑠𝑈,1 = (𝑗, 𝑎, 𝑘, 𝑑; 𝑔𝑗) , and 𝑠𝑅 = (𝑎) , respectively. 25  The corresponding state 
spaces for each type of workers are defined as 
,0ES , ,1ES , ,0US , ,1US , and RS . 
Lastly, the state space for the entire economy is defined as S . 
A stationary recursive equilibrium is a set of 1) value functions for the 
employed, the unemployed, and the retired; 2) decision rules for the employed 
(consumption and assets), the unemployed (consumption, assets, job search efforts, 
application for unemployment benefits), and the retired (consumption, assets); 3) 
redistribution from deceased workers (𝑥), and lump-sum transfer income from the 
government (𝑇); and 4) the distribution of workers (𝜇(𝑆)) such that: 
 
1. Given wages (𝑤) and interest rates (𝑟) exogenously, the decision rules for 
each type of worker are solutions to the relevant workers’ problems.  
 
25
Although the skill level (𝑔𝑗 ) is not a state variable, it is included in the individual state vector for 
convenience in defining equilibrium mathematically. 
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2. The level of redistribution from deceased workers ( x ) is determined as 
follows: 
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where 
j  denotes the measure of the age group j  and 0  denotes the 
measure of new entrants, which is defined as 𝜇0 = ∫(1 − 𝜌𝑗) 𝜇𝑗𝑑𝑆. 
 
3. Exogenously given the consumption tax rate (𝜏𝑐), the labor income tax rate 
(𝜏𝑙), the asset income tax rate (𝜏𝑘), and the UI premium (𝜏𝑢),
26
 the lump-sum 
transfer income from the government (𝑇) satisfies the following government 
budget constraint for the general account budget.
27
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4. The distribution of workers is time invariant. That is, the following condition 
is satisfied. 
   1  for all  and t.t tS S S    
 
IV. Calibration 
 
A. Functional Forms 
 
I use the following CRRA
28
 utility function for consumption, which is widely 
 
26
In this model, the UI premium is exogenously given rather than determined in equilibrium. Unemployment 
benefits are funded by the Employment Insurance Fund in Korea, which is accumulated and managed separately 
from the general account budget. Therefore, the budget constraint defined above does not include expenditures for 
unemployment benefits. The budget constraint for the Employment Insurance Fund is not explicitly considered 
because in reality it is highly likely that the budget constraint for the Employment Insurance Fund will not be 
balanced due to complicated issues related to the reserve fund to expenditure ratio and expenditures for maternity 
protection. Although the budget constraint for the Employment Insurance Fund is not explicitly considered in this 
paper, it can be defined as follows: 
 
𝜅 ∫ 𝑏(𝑔𝑗)𝜇(𝑆𝑈,1)𝑑𝑆 = 2𝜏𝑢 ∫ 𝑔
𝑗𝑤𝜇(𝑆𝐸,1)𝑑𝑆 
 
where 𝜅 denotes the statutory reserve fund to the expenditure ratio, which is 1~1.5 as of 2015. 
27
Because firms are not explicitly modeled in this paper, it is assumed that the government pays the 
employer’s contribution to unemployment benefits instead of firms. This is shown in the last term of the left-hand 
side of the government budget constraint. In Korea, as the employer and the worker pay half of the UI premium, 
the model assumes that the government pays the same rate as the worker. The last term should be interpreted as 
expenditures of the government, not revenues from the UI system despite the fact that the term encompasses the 
UI premium (𝜏𝑢). If firms are explicitly considered in the model, the last term is dropped in the government budget 
constraint. Therefore, the lump-sum subsidy (𝑇) does not include UI premiums collected but includes firms’ 
contributions to the UI due to technical issues. Therefore, the only tax revenues are redistributed equally in a 
lump-sum manner. 
28
Constant Relative Risk Aversion. 
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used in various macroeconomic studies. A separable utility function between 
consumption and leisure is assumed. 
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Because there is no endogenous choice for working hours (intensive margin) in 
the model, the leisure part of the utility function is simplified. 𝛾𝑒 denotes disutility 
from working. Given that working hours in this model are normalized to one, 
leisure for the employed has a value of 0, whereas leisure for the unemployed and 
retired has a value of 1.  
Unemployed workers incur disutility from job searching. The level of disutility 
depends on job search effort, and it is represented in the following functional form, 
as in Nakajima (2012) and Kitao (2014). 
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Lastly, I assume a linear function for the job finding rate 𝑝(𝑗, 𝑠), which depends 
on age and the job search effort following Kitao (2014). 
 
 , jp j s p s  
 
B. Parameters 
 
Parameters in this paper can be categorized into two groups. The first set of 
parameters is calculated independently of the model or borrowed from previous 
studies. The second group is determined endogenously in the model by matching 
the statistics calculated from the data generated by the model with those calculated 
from actual data. The actual statistics used in the calibration of the model are 
mostly based on 2015 data. Some data, such as those related to UI and 
unemployment benefits, are based on the most currently data available as of 2014 
or earlier.  
 
Parameters Calibrated Outside of the Model 
 
The parameter for risk aversion (𝜎) in the utility function is assumed to be 2; this 
has often been used in macroeconomic studies, such as in Nakajima (2012). The 
parameter which determines the magnitude of disutility from job search (𝛾𝑠) is 
normalized to one. Because only the relative size of 𝛾𝑠 and the marginal job 
finding rate by age group (𝑝𝑗) matter, 𝛾𝑠 is normalized to one in this paper. The 
parameter for the elasticity of the job search disutility with respect to the job search 
effort (𝜓) is set to 1 based on estimates from Yashiv (2000), Christensen et al. 
(2005), Lise (2012), and Pei and Xie (2016). 
The minimum age in the model is assumed to be 20 years considering the actual 
age of entry into the labor market for high school graduates. The maximum age is 
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assumed to be 84 years based on the average life expectancy for 2015. The number 
of age groups (𝐽) is set to 4; 20~29 (𝑗 = 1), 30~49 (𝑗 = 2), 50~64 (𝑗 = 3), and 
65~84 years (𝑗 = 𝑗𝑅 = 𝐽 = 4). 
This assumption reflects that the maximum benefit duration varies depending on 
an age of 29 or less, 30 to 49 years, and 50 to 64 years in reality. The last age group 
is for retired workers. 
In this model, workers aged 20 to 64 years are assumed to be either employed or 
unemployed for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, the employment rates for the age 
groups, 20~29, 30~49, and 50~64 years are recalculated from the Economically 
Active Population Survey (EAPS) by excluding non-participants and treating the 
total population as the sum of the employed and the unemployed in EAPS. The 
number of people aged 65 to 84 years (the retired) is assumed to be the sum of non-
participants aged 20 to 64 years in EAPS so that labor force participation rates for 
all workers (aged 20~84 years) in the model is identical to those from EAPS.
29
 To 
summarize the population structure of the model, the total population aged 20 to 64 
years is divided into the employed and unemployed, and the total population aged 
65 to 84 years is classified as non-participants. The number of employed and 
unemployed aged 20 to 64 years in the model is identical to the ratio of the 
employed and unemployed aged 20 to 64 years to the total population aged 20 to 
64 years in EAPS. The total population aged 65 to 84 years in the model is 
identical to the ratio of non-participants aged 20-64 years to the total population 
aged 20 to 64 years in EAPS. The definition and distribution of the population in 
the model are summarized in Table 1. 
The parameters related to the population structure are the age-group-specific 
survival probabilities (𝜌𝑗) and the probabilities of transitioning to the next age 
group (𝜙𝑗 ).
30
 The age-group-specific survival probabilities are calculated by 
converting annual age-specific mortality probabilities into the monthly survival 
probabilities for each age group using the 2015 Life Tables for Korea from the 
Statistics Korea. The Population shares of each age in 2015 are used as weights 
when computing the age-group-specific mortality probabilities, which are the 
weighted averages of the relevant age-specific mortality probabilities. The annual 
age-group-specific mortality probability is then converted into the monthly age- 
group-specific survival probability. The probability of a transition to the next age 
group is determined by the age-group-specific survival probabilities (𝜌𝑗) and the 
population shares by age group (𝜇𝑗 ) that satisfy the following simultaneous 
equations assuming that the population shares by age group as shown in Table 1 
remain stable.
31
 
 
 
29
The assumption of the number of workers aged 65 years or older is immaterial in this paper because 
workers aged 65 years or older are not covered by the UI system.  
30
The probability of transitioning to the next age group for the last age group (𝜙4) is 0 by definition. 
31
The solutions (𝜙𝑗) satisfying the simultaneous equations can be obtained given the population shares by age 
group (𝜇𝑗) and the age group specific survival probabilities (𝜌𝑗). 
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The last equation means that the population share for new entrants into the 
economy (𝜇0) is identical to the sum of deceased workers. 
The insured period (𝑘) increases stochastically when the employed work at firms 
covered by UI. Specifically, I assume eight states for the insured period from ‘no 
insurance history’ (𝑘 = 1) to ’10 years or more’ (𝑘 = 8)32 as shown in Table 2, 
considering the way in which the maximum benefit duration is actually determined.
33
 
It is assumed that when the workers who have no insurance history (𝑘 = 1) start to 
work at a firm covered by UI, their insured period becomes ‘0~6 months’ (𝑘 = 2) 
immediately with probability 1. The probabilities of a transition to the next state for 
the insured period are calculated based on the average duration in each state.
34
 The 
probabilities of a transition to the next state for the state of ‘10 years or more’ 
(𝑘 = 8) is assumed to be 035 because it is the last state for the insured period. The 
transition probability matrix for the insured period is shown in Table 3. The minimum 
 
TABLE 1—POPULATION STRUCTURE IN THE MODEL 
Index for age group Age Employed Unemployed Non-participants Total (𝜇𝑗) 
1 20~29 years 0.1111 0.0111 - 0.1222 
2 30~49 years 0.3714 0.0102 - 0.3816 
3 50~64 years 0.2292 0.0058 - 0.2349 
4 65~84 years - - 0.2613 0.2613 
Total 20~84 years 0.7117 0.0270 0.2613 1.0000 
Source: Statistics Korea, EAPS. 
 
TABLE 2—THE INSURED PERIOD (𝑘) IN THE MODEL 
𝑘 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Insured 
period 
No 
insurance 
history 
0~6 
months 
6~9 
months 
9~12 
months 
1~3 
years 
3~5 
years 
5~10 
years 
10 years 
or more 
  
 
32
The last state for the insured period is assumed to be ’10 years or more’ because there is no difference in the 
maximum benefit durations for insured periods greater than or equal to ten years in reality. 
33
Although it is sufficient to consider an insured period less than or equal to one year (12 months), the states 
for ‘0~6 months’, ‘6~9 months’, and ‘9~12 months’ are also included in the model so that it can be used in the 
policy experiments related to the eligibility condition for the minimum insured period. In the current UI system, 
the unemployment benefits are provided to involuntarily unemployed workers who have been in insurance-
covered employment for at least 180 days (approximately six months) during an 18-month period before their job 
loss. However, it is often discussed among policymakers that the minimum insured period for the eligibility should 
be increased from 180 days (six months) to 270 days (nine months). 
34
For example, when the insured period is ‘1~3 years’ (𝑘 = 5), the state will then be maintained for two years 
(24 months) on average. Therefore, the probability of transitioning to the next state is assumed to be 1/24 because 
the duration of each state is the inverse of the exit probability from each state. 
35
In other words, it can be expressed that the probability of staying in the state of ‘10 years or more’ is 1.  
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TABLE 3—THE TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX FOR THE INSURED PERIOD 
        𝑘′ 
𝑘 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1 − 𝜋12 𝜋12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 − 𝜋23 𝜋23 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 1 − 𝜋34 𝜋34 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 1 − 𝜋45 𝜋45 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 1 − 𝜋56 𝜋56 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 − 𝜋67 𝜋67 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 − 𝜋78 𝜋78 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 𝜋88 
Note: 𝜋𝑖𝑗 denotes the transition probability from 𝑘 = 𝑖 to 𝑘 = 𝑗. 
 
insured period to be eligible for unemployment benefits is set to be six months (180 
days) based on the Employment Insurance Act.
36
 
The method used to determine the monthly unemployment benefits in the model 
follows the actual benefit formula in 2015, which is based on the Employment 
Insurance Act and the Enforcement Decree. The amount of daily unemployment 
benefits is the wage replacement rate (𝑏𝑟) multiplied by the three-month average 
daily wage before the job loss. The wage replacement rate is 50% in actuality. The 
upper limit of the average daily wage (𝑔𝑑) is set to 86,000 won, which means that 
the upper limit of the daily unemployment benefit is 43,000 won. The lower limit 
of the daily unemployment benefit is determined by the wage replacement rate for 
the lower limit (𝑏𝑟,𝑙) multiplied by the daily minimum wage (hourly minimum 
wage × 8 hours). The wage replacement rate for the lower limit was 90% and the 
daily minimum wage is 44,640 won (5,580 won × 8 hours) in 2015. Therefore, the 
lower limit of the daily unemployment benefits is calculated to be 40,176 won. 
Because the period in the model is one month, the monthly unemployment benefits 
(𝑏(𝑔𝑗)) are the daily unemployment benefits times 30 (days). The amount of the 
monthly unemployment benefit is summarized using the following equation: 
 
    ,min 30,  max , 8 30j jr d r r l hb g b g b g b w        
 
The maximum benefit duration (𝑑(𝑗, 𝑘)) in the model is determined in the same 
manner used in the actual UI system in Korea, as shown in Table 4. It should be 
noted that the maximum benefit duration depends on the age of the worker and 
their insured period. 
The tax rate for consumption expenditures (𝜏𝑐) is set to 10% based on the value-
added tax (VAT) rate in Korea of 10%. The labor income tax rate (𝜏𝑙) is assumed to 
be 13.15%, which is the average labor income tax rate for unmarried individuals in 
Korea. This represents the OECD (2016) rate of 13.80%
37
 less the worker’s  
 
36In fact, more stringent requirements, 180 days ‘over the last 18 months’, are required in reality. If the ‘over 
the last 18 months’ condition is explicitly included in the model, the model setup becomes more complicated and 
the computation becomes more difficult due to the additional individual state variable. Therefore, here I use 
relaxed requirements than the actual eligibility requirements by counting the insured period ‘over the whole period 
of employment’ rather than ‘over the last 18 months’. 
37
The rate of 13.80% is the effective tax rate taking into account the workers’ contributions to all forms of 
social insurance.   
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TABLE 4—THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT DURATION IN THE MODEL 
Age 
Insured period 
Less than 1 year 
(𝑘 = 2,3,4) 
1~3 years 
(𝑘 = 5) 
3~5 years 
(𝑘 = 6) 
5~10 years 
(𝑘 = 7) 
10 years or more 
(𝑘 = 8) 
20~29 years 3 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
30~49 years 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 7 months 
50~64 years 3 months 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 
Note: In the actual UI in Korea, the maximum benefit duration is defined in days rather than in months. Because 
the model period is assumed to be one month, the maximum benefit duration is redefined as months in Table 3 by 
dividing the maximum benefit duration defined in days by 30. 
Source: Employment Insurance Act 
 
contribution of the UI premium (𝜏𝑢) in Korea of 0.65%. The asset income tax rate 
is set to 15.40% based on the actual interest income tax rate of 15.4%. The 
worker’s contribution of the UI premium is 0.65%, which is half of the total 
insurance premium of 1.30%. Because the model does not explicitly reflect firms, 
the remaining employer’s contribution, 0.65% is assumed to be paid by the 
government on behalf of the firm, as discussed in the model subsection. The real 
interest rate ( r ) is set to 1% based on the interest rate of Korean one-year Treasury 
bonds as of 2015, 1.794%, and the average consumer inflation rate in 2015, 0.7%. 
The monthly wage rate for the efficiency unit of labor supply (𝑤) is normalized to 
one. The parameters related to the utility function, population structure, UI, tax 
rates, and prices explained above, which are determined regardless of model, are 
summarized in Table 5. 
Because the monthly wage rate for the efficiency unit of labor supply is 
normalized to one, the monthly wages are identical to the skill levels which are 
exogenously given and constant within age groups. The monthly wages (skill 
levels) in the model are described in Table 6. The ten levels of wages for each age 
group in Table 6 are calculated based on the monthly average wage data from the 
EAPS Additional Survey by Employment Type (EAPS ASET)
38
 of 2015. For each 
age group, there are ten levels of wages which are constant within each age group. 
However, as the age group changes stochastically, it can be scaled up or down 
while maintaining the decile within the new age group.
39
 In this way, the model 
reflects an age-earnings profile without time-varying labor productivity shocks.
40
 
In other words, in cases in which workers stay in the same age group, their levels 
of wages are fixed in the sense that there is no income risk other than 
unemployment risk. By considering only income risk from unemployment, this 
paper focuses on quantifying how much the UI system and private insurance 
instruments (savings and borrowing) are effective as insurance against income risk 
from unemployment.  
 
38
The data were surveyed every March and August before 2017. Starting in 2017, they are surveyed only 
every August. 
39
For example, as the age group increases stochastically, the first decile wage for those aged 20~29 years, 
0.5965, becomes 1.0915, which is the first decile wage for those aged 30~49 years. As the age group of the worker 
increases further, the wage changes to 0.8700, which is the first decile wage for those aged 50~64 years.  
40
If the role of precautionary savings for employed workers is primarily important, time-varying idiosyncratic 
shocks should be a necessary component of the model. In this case, we can refer to Storesletten et al. (2004), 
Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2012), Moon (2015), and Kitao (2015), among others, with regard to incorporating time-
varying productivity shocks into the OLG model. Because idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks themselves 
would not play a significant role in this paper, the model does not incorporate them for the sake of simplicity. 
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TABLE 5—THE PARAMETERS CALIBRATED OUTSIDE THE MODEL 
Parameter Explanation Value Remarks 
Utility function 
𝜎 Degree of risk aversion 2.0000 Nakajima (2012), etc.  
𝛾𝑠 Disutility from working (level) 1.0000 Normalization 
𝜓 Disutility from working (elasticity) 1.0000 Yashiv (2000), Lise (2012) 
Population structure 
𝜌1 Survival probability for 20~29 years 0.9999671 Calculated from Life Tables (2015) 
𝜌2 Survival probability for 30~49 years 0.9998976 Calculated from Life Tables (2015) 
𝜌3 Survival probability for 50~64 years 0.9996430 Calculated from Life Tables (2015) 
𝜌4 Survival probability for 65~84 years 0.9981198 Calculated from Life Tables (2015) 
𝜙1  Transition probability to 30~49 years 0.0050265 Calculated to match pop. shares 
𝜙2 Transition probability to 50~64 years 0.0015073 Calculated to match pop. shares 
𝜙3 Transition probability to 65~84 years 0.0020922 Calculated to match pop. shares 
𝜙4 Transition probability to stay 1.0000000 Calculated to match pop. shares 
𝜇0 Population share of new entrants 0.0006182 Calculated to match pop. shares 
Unemployment insurance 
𝜋12 Prob(no history → 0~6 months) 1.0000 see text 
𝜋23 Prob(0~6 months → 6~9 months) 0.1667  Duration of the state (6 months)  
𝜋34 Prob(6~9 months → 9~12 months) 0.3333  Duration of the state (3 months) 
𝜋45 Prob(9~12 months → 1~3 years) 0.3333  Duration of the state (3 months) 
𝜋56 Prob(1~3 years → 3~5 years) 0.0417  Duration of the state (2 years) 
𝜋67 Prob(3~5 years → 5~10 years) 0.0417  Duration of the state (2 years) 
𝜋78 Prob(5~10 years → 10 years or more) 0.0167  Duration of the state (5 years) 
𝜋88 Prob(stay in ‘10 years or more’) 1.0000 See the text 
𝑘𝑒  The minimum insured period 3 More than 6 months (180 days) 
𝑤ℎ  The hourly minimum wage 5,580 won Minimum wage in 2015 
𝑔𝑑 The upper limit of daily wage 86,000 won Emp. Ins. Enforcement Decree 
𝑏𝑟 Wage replacement rate 0.5 Employment Insurance Act 
𝑏𝑟,𝑙 Wage replacement rate for lower limit  0.9 Employment Insurance Act 
Taxes 
𝜏𝑐 Tax rate for consumption expenditures 0.1000 Value-added tax (VAT) rate, 10% 
𝜏𝑙  Tax rate for labor income  0.1315 OECD (2016) and 𝜏𝑢  
𝜏𝑘 Tax rate for asset income 0.1540 Interest income tax rate, 15.4% 
𝜏𝑢 Worker’s insurance premium for UI 0.0065 Emp. Ins. Enforcement Decree 
Prices 
𝑟 Real interest rate 0.0100 One-year Treasury bond, CPI (2015) 
𝑤 Wage rate for the unit labor supply 1.0000  Normalization 
Note: Emp. Ins. stands for Employment Insurance. 
 
TABLE 6—THE LEVELS OF MONTHLY WAGES (SKILLS) IN THE MODEL 
(Unit: 1 million won) 
Age group 20~29 years 30~49 years 50~64 years 
Decile Wages (skills) Measures Wages (skills) Measures Wages (skills) Measures 
1 0.5965 0.0593 1.0915 0.1105 0.8700 0.1843 
2 0.8495 0.0402 1.5345 0.1568 1.4100 0.2789 
3 1.1025 0.1022 1.9775 0.1710 1.9500 0.1951 
4 1.3555 0.0884 2.4205 0.1560 2.4900 0.0824 
5 1.6085 0.2359 2.8635 0.1391 3.0300 0.0673 
6 1.8615 0.1298 3.3065 0.0942 3.5700 0.0469 
7 2.1145 0.1670 3.7495 0.0392 4.1100 0.0447 
8 2.3675 0.0404 4.1925 0.0596 4.6500 0.0275 
9 2.6205 0.0814 4.6355 0.0339 5.1900 0.0402 
10 2.8735  0.0556  5.0785 0.0399 5.7300  0.0329 
Note: The averages of monthly wages in March and August of 2015 EAPS ASET. 
Source: March and August of 2015 EAPS Additional Survey by Employment Type (EAPS ASET).  
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Parameters Calibrated in the Model 
 
A total of ten parameters are determined to fit the target statistics in the model. 
The parameter for disutility from working (𝛾𝑒) and the probability of involuntary 
unemployment (𝜒) are jointly determined to match the employment rate and 
unemployment rate for those aged 20~64 years from 2015 EAPS. The probability 
of voluntary unemployment (𝑞) is determined to match the ratio of voluntary 
unemployment to total unemployment in the 2014 Yearly Statistics of Employment 
Insurance (YSEI) (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2015). The marginal job 
finding rates by age group (𝑝𝑗) are set to fit the corresponding unemployment rates 
for those aged 20~29, 30~49, and 50~64 years in EAPS. The time discount factor 
(𝛽) and the borrowing limit (𝑎) are jointly determined to match the ratio of net debt 
to total income and the share of workers with net debt under the given real interest 
rate of 1%.  
The target statistics for the ratio of net debt to total income and the share of 
workers with net debt are calculated based on the 2014 Korean Labor and Income 
Panel Study (KLIPS). The information about net debt (or assets) is surveyed at the 
household level, not at the individual level. Therefore, the ratio of net debt to total 
income and the share of workers with net debt can be calculated under appropriate 
assumptions about the number of members with net debt in each household. 
Regarding the ratio of net debt to total income, I assume that the net debt and total 
income are evenly distributed to all household members so that the ratio is 
independent of the number of household members. The share of workers with net 
debt is set to 0.2686, which is the simple average of the share when only one 
member in each household is assumed to have net debt (0.1288) and the share 
when all members of each household are assumed to have net debt (0.4083).  
The parameter for disutility from an application process for unemployment 
benefits (𝜂) is determined to match the ratio of actual UI applicants to the 
unemployed who are eligible for unemployment benefits (0.6920) based on the 
2014 YSEI. The probability that the unemployed will find a firm covered by UI (𝜆) 
is set to match the proportion of wage and salary workers who are covered by UI 
(0.6313) based on the 2015 EAPS ASET. The ten target statistics and parameters 
determined in the model described above are summarized in Tables 7 and 8, 
respectively. 
Some of the calibrated parameters in Table 8 are worth mentioning. The monthly 
probability of voluntary unemployment is calibrated to be 1.00% which is higher 
than the probability of involuntary unemployment, 0.63%. The calibrated marginal 
job finding rate by age group increases with age. This implies that the higher the 
age, the higher the job finding probability given the same level of job search effort. 
The borrowing limit is 5.32 million won. Lastly, the share of firms covered by UI is 
calibrated to be 63.20%. 
Table 9 below compares the target statistics calculated from the model with 
those in the actual data. Most target statistics are fairly well matched. In particular, 
the employment rate and the unemployment rate by age group, which are the most 
important parts of the calibration, fit very well in the model. Moreover, the target 
statistics related to UI do not differ greatly from those of the data. In this sense, the 
model fit most of the target statistics related to the labor market and UI. However,  
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TABLE 7—TARGET STATISTICS FOR THE CALIBRATION 
Target statistics Value Source 
Employment rate for 20~64 0.7117 2015 EAPS 
Unemployment rate for 20~64 0.0907 2015 EAPS 
Unemployment rate for 20~29 0.0267 2015 EAPS 
Unemployment rate for 30~49 0.0245 2015 EAPS 
Unemployment rate for 50~64 0.0366 2015 EAPS 
Ratio of net debt to total income 0.7400 2015 EAPS 
Share of workers with net debt 0.2686 2015 EAPS 
Ratio of voluntary unemployment to total unemployment 0.6110 2014 YSEI 
Ratio of actual applicants to the unemployed eligible for UB 0.6920 2014 YSEI 
Proportion of wage and salary workers covered by UI 0.6313 2015 EAPS ASET 
Note: 1) UB stands for unemployment benefits, 2) EAPS stands for Economically Active Population Survey, 3) 
KLIPS stands for Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, 4) YSEI stands for Yearly Statistics of Employment 
Insurance, 5) EAPS ASET stands for EAPS Additional Survey by Employment Type, 6) The employment rate is 
defined as the number of employed divided by the total population. 
 
TABLE 8—PARAMETERS CALIBRATED IN THE MODEL 
Parameter Explanation Value 
𝛾𝑒  Disutility from working 0.0010 
χ Prob. of involuntary unemployment 0.0063 
𝑞 Prob. of voluntary unemployment 0.0100 
𝑝1 Marginal job finding rate for 20-29  0.1826 
𝑝2 Marginal job finding rate for 30-49 0.9329 
𝑝3 Marginal job finding rate for 50-64 1.1535 
𝛽 Time discount factor  0.9998 
𝑎 Borrowing limit  -5.2300 
𝜂 Disutility from an application for UI 0.2435 
𝜆 Share of firms covered by UI 0.6320 
Note: The unit for the borrowing limit is 1 million won.  
 
TABLE 9—TARGET STATISTICS: MODEL VS. DATA 
Target statistics Model Data 
Employment rate for 20~64 0.7117 0.7117 
Unemployment rate for 20~64 0.0907 0.0907 
Unemployment rate for 20~29 0.0267 0.0267 
Unemployment rate for 30~49 0.0245 0.0245 
Unemployment rate for 50~64 0.0366 0.0366 
Ratio of net debt to total income 0.7397 0.7400 
Share of workers with net debt 0.2762 0.2686 
Ratio of voluntary unemployment to total unemployment 0.6110 0.6110 
Ratio of UI applicants to the unemployed eligible for UB 0.6709 0.6920 
Proportion of wage and salary workers covered by UI 0.6314 0.6313 
Note: UB stands for unemployment benefits. 
 
the ratio of actual UI applicants to the unemployed eligible for unemployment 
benefits is slightly lower than the actual target statistic. It is difficult to match more 
precisely the ratio of UI applicants to the unemployed eligible for unemployment 
benefits most likely due to the differences between two data sets, EAPS and YSEI; 
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The labor market statistics are based on data from EAPS, which is survey data, but 
the statistics related to unemployment benefits are based on data from YSEI, which 
is administrative data. Regarding the share of workers with net debt, the target 
statistic itself is problematic because it is could not be accurately measured, as 
discussed earlier. Because information about net debt is collected at the household 
level in KLIPS, it is possible to calculate the share of households with net debt 
relatively precisely. However, only the minimum and maximum values 
representing the share of workers with net debt can be calculated. In this paper, the 
simple average of the minimum and maximum values is used. Given that the 
average may not be an accurate number for the share of workers with net debt, it 
will be difficult to fit the target statistic in the calibration. 
 
V. Quantitative Analysis 
 
A. Steady State Equilibrium 
 
Table 10 shows the main statistics related to the labor market, consumption, 
assets, and UI in the steady state economy. The statistics used as targets for the 
calibration such as the employment and unemployment rates are nearly identical to 
the actual statistics. The monthly transition probability from employment to 
unemployment (the average job separation rate) predicted by the model is 1.62%.
41
  
  
TABLE 10—THE STEADY STATE ECONOMY 
Statistics Value Statistics Value 
Labor market 
Unemployment rate for 20~64  0.0366 Average job search effort for 20~64 0.8385 
Unemployment rate for 20~29 0.0907 Average job search effort for 20~29 1.1685 
Unemployment rate for 30~49 0.0267 Average job search effort for 30~49 0.6379 
Unemployment rate for 50~64 0.0245 Average job search effort for 50~64 0.5586 
Employment rate for 20~64 0.7117 Transition prob. from E to U 0.0162 
  Transition prob. from U to N 0.4484 
Consumption expenditure and net assets 
Average consumption for 20~84 1.8105 Average net assets for 20~84 11.2485 
Average consumption for 20~29 1.4530 Average net assets for 20~29 3.2573 
Average consumption for 30~49 2.4257 Average net assets for 30~49 18.2689 
Average consumption for 50~64 2.5527 Average net assets for 50~64 19.8885 
Average consumption for 65~84 0.4121 Average net assets for 65~84 -3.0258 
Unemployment insurance 
Ratio of voluntary U to total U 0.6709 The ratio of UI recipients to total U 0.3502 
Equilibrium objects 
Accidental bequests (𝑥) 0.0009 Transfer income from the gov. (𝑇) 0.4114 
Note: 1) E and U stand for employment and unemployment, respectively, 2) UB stands for unemployment benefits, 
3) The unit for consumption expenditure, net assets, accidental bequests, and transfer income from the government 
is 1 million won, 4) YSEI stands for Yearly Statistics of Employment Insurance.  
 
41
Because endogenous quitting is not accounted for in the model, the average job separation rate comes 
purely from the probability rates of involuntary unemployment (0.0063) and voluntary unemployment (0.0100), 
which are calibrated in the model, with some degree of round-off error in each case.  
26 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2018 
The monthly transition probability from unemployment to employment (the 
average job finding rate) is 44.84%. The average job search effort value is 0.8385, 
and it decreases with age. The job search efforts for workers aged 30~49 and 
50~64 years are 53.6% and 47.8%, respectively, relative to that of workers aged 
20~29 years. These values are directly related to the parameters for marginal job 
finding rates by age group presented in Table 7. For those 20~29 years of age, the 
marginal job finding rate by age group is remarkably low. The marginal job finding 
rate means an incremental increase in the job finding rate when increasing the job 
search effort by one unit. A smaller marginal job finding rate implies a lower job 
finding rate given the same amount of job search effort. Therefore, the higher job 
search efforts for those aged 20~29 years can be understood by considering that 
workers aged 20~29 years must make a greater job search effort in order to 
overcome their relatively low job finding rate per unit of job search effort. 
The average consumption expenditure is calculated and found to be 1.81 million 
won. The consumption expenditure for workers aged 20~29, 30~49 years, 50~64 
years, and 65~84 years are calculated and found to be 1.45, 2.43, 2.55, and 0.41 
million won, respectively. The average amount of net assets is found to be 11.25 
million won. Those values for workers aged 20~29, 30~49, 50~64 years, and 
65~84 years are calculated to be 3.25, 18.27, 19.89, and -3.03 million won, 
respectively. 
With regard to unemployment benefits, the ratio of UI applicants to the 
unemployed eligible for unemployment benefits is calculated at 67.09%, somewhat 
lower than the ratio in the actual data, as discussed in the calibration subsection.
42
 
The ratio of actual UI recipients to the unemployed is predicted at approximately 
35%, similar to that from the actual data. Lastly, redistribution from deceased 
workers (accidental bequests) and transfer income from the government, which are 
calculated from the equilibrium of the model, are nearly zero and 0.41 million won, 
respectively. This model assumes that the government pays the same amount of 
transfer income to all workers by simplifying detailed welfare systems other than 
unemployment benefits, such as the National Pension, National Basic Livelihood 
Security, and the Basic Pension system.
43
 Therefore, the estimated amount of 
transfer income, 0.41 million won per month, can be interpreted as the average of 
benefits from all welfare systems other than unemployment benefits. 
 
B. Policy Experiments 
 
In this subsection, I quantify the overall effect of enhanced unemployment 
benefits in Korea using the calibrated overlapping generation model. In particular, 
two specific policy chances are examined: increasing wage replacement rates by 
10%p and extending maximum benefit durations by one month. Among 
policymakers and researchers, these two policies are considered feasible policy 
options in order to enhance unemployment benefits considering the current realistic 
 
42
This statistic is used as a target statistic to calibrate the parameter for disutility from the application process 
for unemployment benefits.  
43
In the process of reflecting the heterogeneity of workers and the detailed UI system in Korea, the model 
setup and computation are already complicated. Therefore, welfare systems which do not directly affect 
unemployment benefits are not explicitly modeled in this paper.  
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situation in Korea. Because the ranges of unemployed people who would be 
affected by these two policy changes differ, the overall effects of the two policy 
changes can also differ. In particular, the relative sizes of consumption smoothing 
effects and moral hazard effects can differ between the two policy changes. 
Moreover, because the increases in the UI premium to achieve the two policy 
options would differ, the welfare of all workers who are currently paying the UI 
premium and who are likely to pay in the future can be affected to a different 
extent. In sum, the two policy options affect social welfare in different ways 
through consumption smoothing effects, moral hazard effects, and changes in the 
UI premium for workers.  
The three effects of policy changes on social welfare are correspondingly 
represented mainly by changes in consumption levels, job search efforts (or the 
total employment rate), and the UI premium in the model. Although the model 
does not explicitly reflect the equilibrium UI premium as discussed earlier, the UI 
premium is adjusted to maintain the fiscal surplus level of UI funds before the 
policy changes
44
 in the following policy experiments in order to capture the effect 
of changes in the UI premium. 
Consumption smoothing effects are mostly captured by the changes in the 
consumption for UI recipients and the employed. An increase in the consumption 
level of UI recipients means that the decline in consumption upon a job loss for the 
employed is smaller than that before the policy change. Therefore, if other factors 
are constant, the welfare level of the employed is expected to increase due to the 
improved consumption smoothing. It should be noted that the welfare level of 
employed workers who are currently paying the UI premium as well as the welfare 
level of workers who are not paying the UI premium will increase, as employed 
workers working at firms which are not currently covered by UI can also claim 
unemployment benefits upon a job loss based on their recent history with UI. In 
addition, they may be employed by firms that are covered by UI in the future. The 
welfare for workers includes all possibilities of the future, including those 
mentioned above. Strictly speaking, changes in consumption of UI recipients also 
reflect possible future burdens caused by the increased UI premium and the 
negative effects from the reduced job search effort due to the moral hazard effect. 
Despite the negative effects of policy changes on it, the increase in consumption of 
UI recipients implies that consumption smoothing effects are relatively large in that 
they offset the negative effects. 
The enhanced consumption smoothing effects come at a cost because more 
generous unemployment benefits immediately raise the insurance premium for 
employed workers who are currently paying the UI premium and potentially 
increase the UI premium for the other workers who may pay the UI premium in the 
future. If the other factors remain constant, the increased UI premium will lower 
the consumption and welfare levels. Considering that this paper assumes that the 
government pays the UI premium on behalf of firms, the increased UI premium 
will decrease the transfer income from the government (𝑇) for all workers and will 
slightly reduce welfare for all workers, including the retired workers who are not 
directly affected by the policy change in UI. Although the welfare effect from the 
 
44
This amount is approximately 109.68 billion won in a steady state economy in the model. 
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reduced transfer income from the government is quantitatively negligible, this 
limitation in the model should be taken into account when interpreting the results, 
especially with regard to welfare for the retired. 
Lastly, the enhanced unemployment benefits are a factor in the reduction of 
welfare of the unemployed through the decreased job search efforts. Because more 
generous unemployment benefits reduce the value of employment for UI recipients, 
they will reduce their job search efforts, resulting in lower job finding probabilities 
and employment rates. Although a decrease in the disutility from the job search 
effort may slightly improve the welfare of the unemployed, lower job search efforts 
will generally reduce the welfare of the entire economy due to the following 
composition effects. Because the welfare level of the employed is substantially 
higher than that of the unemployed, the decline in the employment rate resulting 
from the reduced job search efforts decreases the welfare of the overall economy, 
assuming that all other factors remain constant. 
 
Policy Option 1: Increase in Wage Replacement Rates by 10%p 
 
When the wage replacement rate is raised by 10%p from the current level (50%) 
to 60%, the enhanced UI benefits will mainly impact those whose benefits are 
above the lower limit of unemployment benefits. This occurs because the lower 
limit of monthly unemployment benefits is determined by another rule, 90% of 
minimum wages. Because a majority of UI recipients receive the lower limit of 
benefits, most UI recipients are not affected by the policy change that increases 
wage replacement rates. In the steady state economy, the policy change affects 
19.31% of all UI recipients, consisting of UI recipients whose benefits are above 
the lower limit (16.37%) and a small number of UI recipients who receive the 
lower limit of benefits before the policy change
45
 (2.94%). In other words, the 
policy change mainly affects UI recipients whose wages before job loss are higher 
among all UI recipients. The cutoff wage is calculated to be 2.0088 million won 
such that 60% of the cutoff wage amounts to 1.2053 million won, which is the 
lower limit of monthly unemployment benefits as of 2015.   
Table 11 shows the results of the policy experiment. When the wage replacement 
rate is increased by 10%p, the overall social welfare for those aged 20~84 years is 
reduced. On average, the negative effects of the drop in the employment rate due to 
decreased job search efforts and the rise in the UI premium rate outweigh the 
positive effects of the increase in consumption for UI recipients. The employment 
rate for those aged 20~64 years decreases by 0.04%p due to the 1.56% decrease in 
the average job search efforts. The UI premium increases by 0.08%p while the 
average consumption of UI recipients increases by 5.82%. Higher monthly UI 
benefits increase the number of UI applicants and the total number of UI recipients 
is increased by approximately 9.18%. Total welfare drops by 4.55% in terms of the 
current consumption for those aged 20~84, indicating that the decrease in welfare 
is equivalent to a 4.55% reduction in the current consumption of the average 
worker who currently consumes 1.8105 million won.
46
 The overall welfare effect  
 
45
83.63% of all UI recipients are calculated to be affected by the lower limit in the steady state economy.   
46
The welfare measure in this paper is different from widely used measures in other papers such as in  
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TABLE 11—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 1 
Statistics Baseline 60% % change 
Average consumption for 20~84 1.8105 1.8104 -0.00 
for E (covered by UI) 2.3238 2.3230 -0.03 
for E (not covered by UI) 2.3343 2.3348  0.02 
for U (UI recipients) 1.5654 1.6565  5.82 
for U (non-UI recipients)  1.7914 1.7695 -1.22 
for R  0.4121 0.4121 -0.00 
for 20~64 2.3052 2.3051 -0.00 
Average job search effort for 20~64  0.8385 0.8254 -1.56 
for U (UI recipients) 0.4243 0.4234 -0.22 
for U (non-UI recipients)  1.0618 1.0681  0.60 
(Employment rate for 20~64)  0.7117 0.7113 -0.06 
UI premium for E (covered by UI)   0.0065 0.0073 11.54 
% change in total welfare for 20~84 - - -0.0022 (-4.55) 
% change in average welfare for 20~84  - - -0.0022 (-4.55) 
for E (covered by UI) - - -0.0066 (-15.44) 
for E (not covered by UI) - - -0.0080 (-18.19) 
for U (UI recipients) - - 1.3618 (large+) 
for U (non-UI recipients)  - - -0.3026 (-86.94) 
for R  - - -0.0004 (-0.22) 
for 20~64 - - -0.0028 (-7.21) 
Measure for 20~84  1.0000 1.0000  0.00 
for E (covered by UI) 0.4493 0.4492 -0.03 
for E (not covered by UI) 0.2623 0.2621 -0.10 
for U (UI recipients) 0.0095 0.0103  9.18 
for U (non-UI recipients)  0.0176 0.0171 -2.54 
for R  0.2613 0.2613  0.00 
The number of UI recipients 0.0095 0.0103  9.18 
above lower limits 16.37% - - 
lower limits  83.63% - - 
affected by the policy change 19.31% - - 
above lower limits 16.37% - - 
lower limits  2.94% - - 
Accidental bequests (𝑥) 0.0009 0.0009  0.09 
Transfer income from the government (𝑇) 0.4114 0.4103 -0.28 
Note: 1) The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the average current consumption). In addition, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be 
applied because the welfare gain is substantially large, 2) % changes in welfare without parentheses indicate % 
changes in welfare in terms of the utility level, 3) Because the size of the total population is one, the total welfare 
and the average welfare for those aged 20~84 are identical.  
                                                                                                        
Chattergee et al. (2007), Mukoyama (2013), and Conesa et al. (2017). In this paper, the consumption equivalent 
variation (CEV), most commonly used in the literature, cannot be computed due to the assumption that the utility 
function is separable among consumption, leisure and UI application costs. The equivalent variation in wealth, 
which is another popular welfare measure, also cannot be applied due to the existence and importance of the 
borrowing limits (𝑎) in this paper. Alternatively, this paper uses the equivalent variation in the current consumption 
for an average worker, referring to how much the current consumption of the average worker should be changed to 
achieve the same level of welfare after the policy changes. The definition of the welfare measure is given as 
follows: 
𝑢(𝑐0̅(1 + 𝑥), 𝑙) − 𝑢(𝑐0̅, 𝑙) = 𝑊1 − 𝑊0  
 
Here, 𝑊0 and 𝑊1  denote the average welfare for a relevant group before and after a policy change. 𝑐0̅ 
denotes the average consumption for the group in the steady state economy before the policy change. 𝑥 measures 
how much the current consumption for the average worker of the group should be changed to achieve the same 
level of welfare after the policy change. Note that if there is no change in welfare (𝑊0 = 𝑊1), 𝑥 = 0. 
The greatest disadvantage of this measure is that the equivalent variation cannot be applied to large welfare 
gains due to the concavity of the utility function. Specifically, this measure cannot be used for unemployed 
workers whose welfare gains are large, such as UI recipients and non-UI recipients. 
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does not appear to be large, but the welfare changes are very different among 
different workers as noted in Mukoyama (2013). 
The changes in the average welfare level by labor market status are as follows. 
The average welfare for UI recipients increases, reflecting the effect of the increase 
in monthly unemployment benefits by offsetting the negative effects. Given that 
the degree of improvement in the consumption smoothing effects is mostly 
captured by changes in welfare for UI recipients, the average welfare for other 
workers is expected to increase as well. However, the results of the policy 
experiment show that the average welfare for workers other than UI recipients is 
reduced because the negative effect from the increase in the UI premium is 
overwhelming. As noted above, the policy change that increases the wage 
replacement by 10%p is applied to only the top 19.31% of UI recipients when they 
are sorted by wage (or skill) level. This implies that most workers do not benefit 
from the policy change, whereas they must pay the increased UI premium in the 
present or the future. Because this negative effect outweighs the positive 
consumption smoothing effects, the overall welfare is reduced by the policy 
change. 
Table 12 shows the overall effects of the policy change for the groups directly 
affected and indirectly affected by the policy change. The comparison of changes in 
the average welfare level by labor market status between two groups clearly reveals 
  
TABLE 12—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 1 BY SUBGROUP (WAGE) 
Statistics 
% change 
Directly affected group 
(high wage) 
Others 
(low wage) 
Average consumption for 20~84  0.01 -0.03 
for E (covered by UI)  0.00 -0.05 
for E (not covered by UI)  0.06 -0.01 
for U (UI recipients)  7.28 -0.03 
for U (non-UI recipients)  -0.15 -0.04 
for R  -0.00 -0.00 
for 20~64    0.00 -0.04 
Average job search effort for 20-64  -4.05  0.00 
for U (UI recipients) -11.59  0.02 
for U (non-UI recipients)   0.56  0.01 
(Employment rate for 20~64)  -0.11 -0.00 
UI premium for E (covered by UI)   11.54 11.54 
% change in total welfare for 20~84 0.0031 (9.07) -0.0075 (-10.70) 
% change in average welfare for 20~84  0.0031 (9.07) -0.0075  (-10.70) 
for E (covered by UI) 0.0075 (33.07) -0.0092  (-15.36) 
for E (not covered by UI) 0.0084 (38.92) -0.0106  (-17.36) 
for U (UI recipients) 0.7552 (large+) -0.0045  (-8.05) 
for U (non-UI recipients) 0.0807 (large+) -0.0085  (-11.26) 
for R  -0.0004 (-0.22) -0.0004  (-0.23) 
for 20~64 0.0046 (18.08) -0.0096  (-15.84) 
The number of UI recipients 47.37 0.04 
Measure of group 
in terms of population  53.49% 46.51% 
in terms of UI recipients 19.31% 80.69% 
Note: 1) The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the average current consumption). In addition, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be 
applied because the welfare gain is substantially large, 2) % changes in welfare without parentheses indicate % 
changes in welfare in terms of the utility level, 3) Because the size of the total population is one, the total welfare 
and the average welfare for those aged 20~84 are identical.  
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why the overall welfare is reduced by the policy change. The welfare for the group 
directly affected by the policy change increases while the welfare for the other 
group decreases. The consumption smoothing effects are larger than the negative 
effects, resulting in increased social welfare in the group directly affected by the 
policy change. On the other hand, the group that is not directly affected by the 
policy change does not benefit from the increased wage replacement rate, but their 
current or future burdens from the increased UI premium worsen their welfare. 
Because the welfare reduction in the latter group (the low-wage group) is larger 
than the welfare increase in the former group (the high-wage group), the total 
welfare is decreased. This comparison also explains why the average job search 
effort for non-UI recipients increases by 0.60% in Table 11. Most of the increase in 
the job search effort is attributed to non-UI recipients belonging to the high-wage 
group. As the value of employment for the high-wage group increases, non-UI 
recipients belonging to this group will have more incentives to look for jobs. 
Table 13 shows the overall effects of the policy change by subgroup defined as 
wage level and age. Although the degree of the welfare effect by age group differs, 
there is no change in the result showing that welfare increases only in the group of 
workers with relatively high wage levels, as with higher ages, monthly UI benefits 
(resulting from the higher wages) and longer maximum benefit durations, the 
consumption for older UI recipients is expected to increase more. On the other 
hand, the decline in the job search effort will be more severe for older workers 
because the average amounts of net assets for older workers are higher than those 
for younger workers, as shown in Table 10. Workers who have net debts (net assets 
< 0) are more likely to face liquidity constraints and the moral hazard effects can 
be smaller for those workers, as noted in Chetty (2008). This result of s significant 
decrease in the job search effort for older workers, as shown in Table 13, is also 
consistent with Michelacci and Ruffo’s (2015) claim that the older the unemployed 
are, the larger the moral hazard effects become. The relative size of consumption 
smoothing effects and moral hazard effects determines the overall welfare changes 
in each age group.  
 
TABLE 13—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 1 BY SUBGROUP (WAGE ×AGE) 
Age group Statistics 
% change 
High wage Low wage 
20~29 
Consumption for U (UI recipients)  1.14 -0.03 
Job search effort for U (UI recipients) -2.53 -0.01 
Welfare for U (UI recipients) 0.0307 (176.26) -0.0073 (-10.60) 
Welfare for age group  0.0054  (13.92) -0.0063  (-9.80) 
30~49 
Consumption for U (UI recipients)  6.35 -0.06 
Job search effort for U (UI recipients) -10.71  0.14 
Welfare for U (UI recipients)  1.4680 (large+) -0.0088 (-15.61) 
Welfare for age group  0.0062  (26.07) -0.0131  (-22.07) 
50~64 
Consumption for U (UI recipients)  12.39 -0.00 
Job search effort for U (UI recipients) -11.66 -0.10 
Welfare for U (UI recipients)  0.9567 (large+) -0.0039 (-6.88) 
Welfare for age group  0.0018  (6.82) -0.0070  (-11.37) 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the current consumption). Additionally, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be applied 
because the welfare gain is substantially large.  
32 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2018 
In case of welfare changes for the low-wage group, changes in the current and 
future burden from the increased UI premium are the most important factor. The 
size of the future cost is expected to be larger for older workers because the 
probability of being employed is higher for these workers. On the other hand, 
considering the remaining period until retirement, this factor will be more 
burdensome for young workers. As a result of these two factors, the welfare decline 
is the largest for those aged 30~49 years, followed in order by those aged 50~64 
and 20~29 years. 
 
Policy Option 2: Extension of the Maximum Benefit Duration by One Month 
 
When maximum benefit durations are extended by one month, the enhanced UI 
benefit impacts potentially all UI recipients regardless of their wage levels before a 
job loss. This is the main difference between the policy that raises wage 
replacement rates and the policy that extends maximum benefit durations. As 
discussed earlier, the former policy directly affects only the top 19.31% of 
recipients whose wage level exceeds 2.0088 million won. Even when the policy 
that extends the maximum benefit duration is applied to all recipients by rule, UI 
recipients who are most directly affected by the policy will be those who exhaust 
their maximum benefit duration before the policy change. Of course, an extension 
of the maximum benefit duration can indirectly affect those who do not exhaust the 
maximum benefit duration through the change in the option value of 
unemployment benefits.  
Table 14 shows the composition of UI recipients who exhaust their maximum 
benefit duration in the steady state economy in the model. The younger the age is, 
the shorter the maximum benefit duration becomes in the UI system in Korea. 
Therefore, the share for those aged 20~29 years is highest. In terms of wage levels, 
UI recipients whose wages are relatively low are more likely to exhaust their 
maximum benefit durations. The share of UI recipients aged over 30 whose wage 
level before their job loss exceeds 2.0088 million won is only 1.2% of all UI 
recipients. They are less likely to exhaust their maximum benefit duration because 
for them the value of employment and the job finding probability are relatively 
high. It can be expected that the policy effect will be more significant, especially 
for UI recipients aged 20~29 and for UI recipients whose wage level is low 
because they are more likely to exhaust their maximum benefit durations and will 
be most affected by the policy change. 
The results of the policy experiment are shown in Table 15. When the maximum 
benefit duration is extended by one month, social welfare overall for those aged 
20~84 is improved. On average, the consumption smoothing effects outweigh the 
negative effects of the drop in the employment rate due to the reduced job search 
effort and the rise in the UI premium. The average consumption and welfare for 
employed workers increase due to enhanced consumption smoothing effects in 
spite of the 0.05%p increase in the UI premium. However, the employment rate for 
aged 20~64 decreases by 0.06%p due to the 3.03% decrease in the average job 
search efforts. Extended maximum benefit durations increase the number of UI 
applicants, and the total number of UI recipients increases by 10.10%. Total 
welfare increases by 11.49% in terms of the current consumption level for those  
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TABLE 14—COMPOSITION OF UI RECIPIENTS WHO EXHAUST THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT DURATION 
Age group 
Wage level 
High wage Low wage Total 
20~29 11.28 36.97 48.24 
30~49 1.19 25.99 27.18 
50~64 0.01 24.57 24.58 
Total 12.48 87.52 100.00 
Note: The cutoff wage level is assumed to be 2.0088 million won, which is identical 
to that used for policy change 1. 
 
TABLE 15—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 2 
Statistics Baseline 1 mon % change 
Average consumption for 20~84 1.8105 1.8103 -0.01 
for E (covered by UI) 2.3238 2.3243  0.02 
for E (not covered by UI) 2.3343 2.3355  0.05 
for U (UI recipients) 1.5654 1.5530 -0.79 
for U (non-UI recipients)  1.7914 1.7950  0.20 
for R  0.4121 0.4121 -0.00 
for 20~64 2.3052 2.3049 -0.01 
Average job search effort for 20~64  0.8385 0.8131 -3.03 
for U (UI recipients) 0.4243 0.3983 -6.12 
for U (non-UI recipients)  1.0618 1.0614 -0.04 
(Employment rate for 20~64)  0.7117 0.7109 -0.11 
UI premium for E (covered by UI)    0.0065 0.0070  7.69 
% change in total welfare for 20~84 - - 0.0047  (11.49) 
% change in average welfare for 20~84  - - 0.0047  (11.49) 
for E (covered by UI) - - 0.0264  (278.23) 
for E (not covered by UI) - - 0.0225  (169.34) 
for U (UI recipients) - - -0.3955  (-89.04) 
for U (non-UI recipients)  - - 0.0219  (92.74) 
for R  - - -0.0005  (-0.27) 
for 20~64 - - 0.0066  (22.39) 
Measure for 20~84  1.0000 1.0000 -0.00 
for E (covered by UI) 0.4493 0.4490 -0.06 
for E (not covered by UI) 0.2623 0.2618 -0.20 
for U (UI recipients) 0.0095 0.0104 10.10 
for U (non-UI recipients)  0.0176 0.0174 -0.85 
for R  0.2613 0.2613 -0.00 
The number of UI recipients 0.0095 0.0104 10.10 
above lower limits 16.37% - - 
lower limits  83.63% - - 
affected by the policy change 100.00% - - 
above lower limits 16.37% - - 
lower limits 83.63% - - 
Accidental bequests (𝑥) 0.0009 0.0009 -0.09 
Transfer income from the government (𝑇) 0.4114 0.4106 -0.19 
Note: 1) The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the average current consumption). In addition, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be 
applied because the welfare gain is substantially large, 2) % changes in welfare without parentheses indicate % 
changes in welfare in terms of the utility level, 3) Because the size of the total population is one, the total welfare 
and the average welfare for those aged 20~84 are identical. 
 
aged 20~84 years, indicating that the increase in welfare is equivalent to a 11.49% 
increase in the current consumption of the average worker who currently consumes 
1.8105 million won. Based on the changes in consumption and welfare for the 
employed, the positive effect from the improved consumption smoothing is greater 
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than the negative effects. However, the average consumption and welfare for UI 
recipients decrease. This implies that on average the moral hazard effects for UI 
recipients are substantial, offsetting the positive effects on consumption and 
welfare for them. 
Table 16 shows the overall effects of the policy change for the subgroups defined 
by wage level. The criterion for dividing the low-wage and high-wage groups is 
2.0088 million won, which is used for the case of policy change 1. The comparison 
of changes in the average welfare for those aged 20~84 years between the two 
groups reveals where the overall welfare is improved by policy change 2. The 
welfare for the low-wage group increases, whereas the welfare for the high-wage 
group decreases. Because the consumption smoothing effects are larger than other 
negative effects, social welfare for the low-wage group is increased by the policy 
change. Although the decline in job search effort for UI recipients due to the moral 
hazard effects is substantial, the positive consumption smoothing effects for the 
employed are sizable, outweighing the negative effects in the low wage group. 
On the other hand, the negative effects mainly due to the increase in the UI 
premium outweigh the positive consumption smoothing effects for the high-wage 
group. As shown in Table 14, only 12.48% of UI recipients who will be directly 
affected by the extension of the maximum benefit durations are in the high-wage 
group. Therefore, most workers who are part of the high-wage group would not 
benefit from the policy change; accordingly the consumption smoothing effects and 
 
TABLE 16—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 2 BY SUBGROUP (WAGE) 
Statistics 
% change 
High wage Low wage 
Average consumption for 20~84 -0.02  0.02 
for E (covered by UI) -0.04  0.03 
for E (not covered by UI) -0.00  0.05 
for U (UI recipients) -0.22 -0.37 
for U (non-UI recipients)  0.17 -0.02 
for R  -0.00 -0.00 
for 20~64   -0.03  0.03 
Average job search effort for 20~64  -0.32 -4.60 
for U (UI recipients) -0.42 -7.52 
for U (non-UI recipients)  -0.04  0.02 
(Employment rate for 20~64)  -0.00 -0.23 
UI premium for E (covered by UI)   7.69 7.69 
% change in total welfare for 20~84 -0.0034 (-8.23) 0.0125 (25.10) 
% change in average welfare for 20~84  -0.0034  (-8.23) 0.0125  (25.10) 
for E (covered by UI) -0.0056  (-15.65) 0.0313  (160.18) 
for E (not covered by UI) -0.0048  (-13.84) 0.0266  (110.21) 
for U (UI recipients) 0.1391  (large+) -0.2889  (-84.78) 
for U (non-UI recipients)  0.0022  (6.29) -0.0112  (-14.36) 
for R  -0.0005  (-0.27) -0.0005  (-0.27) 
for 20~64 -0.0054  (-15.12) 0.0163  (46.82) 
The number of UI recipients 4.52 11.43 
Measure of group 
in terms of population  53.49% 46.51% 
in terms of UI recipients 19.31% 80.69% 
Note: 1) The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the average current consumption). In addition, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be 
applied because the welfare gain is substantially large, 2) % changes in welfare without parentheses indicate % 
changes in welfare in terms of the utility level, 3) Because the size of the total population is one, the total welfare 
and the average welfare for those aged 20~84 are identical.  
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moral hazard effects for this group would not be large. However, the negative 
impact of the increased UI premium applies to all workers in the high-wage group, 
resulting in a decrease in welfare for this group. Because the welfare increase in the 
low-wage group is greater than the welfare reduction in the high-wage group, the 
total welfare is increased. 
The overall effects of the policy change by subgroup as defined by wage level 
and age are shown in Table 17. Welfare is improved in the group of all workers 
belonging to the low-wage group and workers aged 20~29 years belonging to the 
high-wage group. These results are highly related to the distribution of UI 
recipients directly affected by the policy change, as shown in Table 14. Most 
workers aged over 30 in the high-wage group do not benefit from the policy 
change, but their current or future burden from the increased UI premium worsens 
their welfare. The welfare increase is highest for workers aged 20~29 years in the 
low wage group. The reason for the significant increase in welfare for young 
workers is that their maximum benefit durations are shorter than those of older 
workers and they are more likely to be affected by the extension of the maximum 
benefit duration. Moreover, as noted in Michelacci and Ruffo (2015), the moral 
hazard effects tend to be weaker for young workers.  
The preceding analyses tell us which subgroups play a leading role in improving 
welfare. However, the analyses do not sufficiently explain why the average 
consumption and welfare for UI recipients decrease while their overall welfare is 
improved in Tables 15 and 16. The decline in the average consumption and welfare 
for UI recipients implies that the moral hazard effects for UI recipients are 
substantial, indicating that the negative effects offset the positive effects on 
consumption and welfare. For a deeper investigation of the reason why average 
consumption and welfare for UI recipients drop, the heterogeneity of workers in 
terms of their amounts of net assets is additionally considered in the following 
analysis. According to Chetty (2008) and Michelacci and Ruffo (2015), the amount 
of net assets is an important factor when determining the degree of the moral 
hazard effect. 
 
TABLE 17—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 2 BY SUBGROUP (WAGE ×AGE) 
Age group Statistics 
% change 
High wage Low wage 
20~29 
Consumption for U (UI recipients)  0.43  0.87 
Job search effort for U (UI recipients) -2.44 -8.26 
Welfare for U (UI recipients) 0.0056  (13.24) -0.1911  (-75.65) 
Welfare for age group 0.0034  (8.48) 0.0328  (129.42) 
30~49 
Consumption for U (UI recipients)  0.04 -0.50 
Job search effort for U (UI recipients) -0.77 -9.00 
Welfare for U (UI recipients) 0.0015  (4.06) -0.3826  (-88.97) 
Welfare for age group -0.0077  (-20.35) 0.0099  (27.21) 
50~64 
Consumption for U (UI recipients) -0.00 -0.19 
Job search effort for U (UI recipients) -0.02 -9.43 
Welfare for U (UI recipients) -0.0037  (-7.61) -0.1037  (-66.09) 
Welfare for age group -0.0034  (-10.81) 0.0096  (21.47) 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the current consumption).  
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Table 18 shows the overall effects of the policy change by subgroup defined as 
wage level and the amount of net assets. The cutoff value defining subgroups by 
the amount of net assets is assumed to be 0. Negative amounts of net assets indicate 
positive amounts of net debt. This criterion reflects that whether or not workers 
have net debts may be most crucial in relation to workers’ responses to additional 
income. According to the experiments, the decrease in consumption for UI 
recipients is attributed to the group of workers with positive net assets, especially 
the low-wage group. Workers who hold positive amounts of assets can continue to 
maintain a sufficient level of consumption even when they lose a job. Therefore, 
additional monthly unemployment benefits would not be used to increase 
consumption but would replace the role of net assets. Given that the effect of the 
policy change on consumption of UI recipients is limited, the increase in the 
number of UI recipients lowers the average consumption after the policy change. In  
 
TABLE 18—THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF POLICY CHANGE 2 BY SUBGROUP (WAGE×ASSET) 
Statistics 
% change 
High wage Low wage 
Assets≥0 Assets<0 Assets≥0 Assets<0 
Average consumption for 20~84 -0.03  0.10 -0.06  0.17 
for E (covered by UI) -0.04  0.09 -0.07  0.39 
for E (not covered by UI)  0.00  0.07  0.04  0.91 
for U (UI recipients) -0.19  0.54 -0.52  2.83 
for U (non-UI recipients)   0.19 -0.12 -0.25 -0.06 
for R   0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
for 20~64 -0.03  0.24 -0.06  0.55 
Average job search effort for 20~64  -0.32 -0.16 -5.09 -1.79 
for U (UI recipients) -0.45 -3.06 -6.46 -14.52  
for U (non-UI recipients)  -0.06  0.04  0.02  0.21 
(Employment rate for 20~64)  -0.01  1.34 -0.17 -0.65 
UI premium for E (covered by UI)    7.69  7.69  7.69  7.69 
% change in total welfare for 20~84 
-0.0049 
(-13.48) 
0.0028 
(1.48) 
-0.0416 
(-44.71) 
0.1201 
(5623.57) 
% change in average welfare for 20~84  
-0.0049 
(-13.48) 
0.0028 
(1.48) 
-0.0416 
(-44.71) 
0.1201 
(5623.57) 
for E (covered by UI) 
-0.0056 
(-15.61) 
-0.0018 
(-3.87) 
-0.0295 
(-37.23) 
0.2026 
(large+) 
for E (not covered by UI) 
-0.0046 
(-13.38) 
-0.0294 
(-39.88) 
-0.0134 
(-21.25) 
0.4729 
(large+) 
for U (UI recipients) 
0.1368 
(large+) 
0.1111 
(large+) 
-0.3571 
(-87.50) 
0.5374 
(large+) 
for U (non-UI recipients)  
0.0022 
(6.38) 
0.0043 
(5.10) 
-0.2594 
(-81.75) 
0.1811 
(large+) 
for R  
-0.0002 
(-0.14) 
-0.0005 
(-0.22) 
-0.0005 
(-0.35) 
-0.0005 
(-0.22) 
for 20~64 
-0.0053 
(-14.99) 
-0.0081 
(-13.27) 
-0.0434 
(-46.55) 
0.2747 
(large+) 
The number of UI recipients 4.38 20.48 11.29 12.98 
Measure of group 
in terms of population  40.29% 13.20% 32.13% 14.37% 
in terms of UI recipients 19.14% 0.16% 74.07% 6.63% 
Note: 1) The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the average current consumption). Furthermore, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be 
applied because the welfare gain is substantially large, 2) % changes in welfare without parentheses indicate % 
changes in welfare in terms of the utility level, 3) Because the size of the total population is one, the total welfare 
and the average welfare for those aged 20~84 are identical.  
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TABLE 19—THE AVERAGE JOB SEARCH EFFORT BY SUBGROUP (WAGE×ASSET) 
Average job search effort for U (UI recipients) 
High wage Low wage 
Assets≥0 Assets<0 Assets≥0 Assets<0 
Before the policy change  0.6433 0.9748 0.3481 0.6296 
After the policy change 0.6404 0.9450 0.3256 0.5382 
Change in level -0.0029 -0.0298 -0.0225 -0.0914 
% change -0.45 -3.06 -6.46 -14.52 
 
other words, the decrease in consumption can be understood as a result of the 
increase in the number of UI recipients with positive amounts of net assets, while 
the effect of the policy change on their consumption levels is minimal. This effect 
is greater for the low-wage group than for the high-wage group because the low- 
wage group contains more UI recipients directly affected by the policy.  
The decrease in welfare for UI recipients is mostly attributed to workers with 
positive amounts of assets in the low-wage group. Because they are able to 
maintain their consumption levels when they become unemployed without 
unemployment benefits, additional income support from the unemployment benefit 
will further reduce their already low level of job search efforts, as shown in Table 
19. On the other hand, welfare for UI recipients with positive net assets in the high-
wage group is increased. Given that the value of employment is relatively high and 
they are less likely to exhaust their maximum benefit duration, their decline in the 
job search efforts due to moral hazard effects is not large. The consumption 
smoothing effects outweigh the negative effects, resulting in improved welfare for 
those workers. 
 
C. Discussion 
 
Welfare assessments can vary depending on the magnitudes of policy changes. A 
fair comparison of two competing policy changes should be based on the identical 
costs incurred due to the policy changes. Increases in UI premiums resulting from 
policy changes can be regarded as the magnitudes or costs of the policy changes. In 
this sense, the comparison of the two policy changes in this paper may appear to be 
unfair because the increment in the UI premium stemming from the policy change 
that increases wage replacement rates by 10%p (0.08%p) is slightly higher than 
that by the policy change that extends the maximum benefit duration by one month 
(0.05%p). Although the increases in the UI premium in the two competing policies 
do not differ greatly, in order to address this issue more accurately, I compared a 
policy change that increases wage replacement rates by 5%p (from 50% to 55%) 
with a policy change that extends the maximum benefit duration by one month 
because the former policy change was found to increase the UI premium by 
0.05%p. Similar to the case in which the wage replacement rate is increased by 
10%p, this policy change results in a decrease in social welfare and does not 
change the main results in the paper.  
Additionally, I computed the gradient of the welfare improvement at the current 
system with respect to wage replacement rates and maximum benefit durations, as 
shown in Table 20. When wage replacement rates are increased further, social 
welfare declines at a faster rate. In particular, if the wage replacement rates exceed  
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TABLE 20—THE GRADIENTS OF WELFARE IMPROVEMENT 
Wage replacement rates  Maximum benefit durations 
% 
% change in 
welfare 
UI premium  
Extended # of 
month 
% change in 
welfare 
UI premium 
50 - 0.0065  0 - 0.0065 
60 (-4.55) 0.0073  1 (11.49) 0.0070 
70 (-7.40) 0.0085  2 (25.33) 0.0075 
80 (-95.95) 0.0100  3 (42.44) 0.0080 
90 (-97.81) 0.0130  4 (60.62) 0.0086 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the current consumption). Here, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be applied because 
the welfare gain is substantially large. 
  
70%, there is a sharp reduction in welfare. On the other hand, when the maximum 
benefit durations are extended further, social welfare increases almost linearly. We 
can take away two massages from the findings in Table 20. First, the current wage 
replacement rates (50%) are likely to be near or higher than an optimal level, and 
the current maximum benefit duration appears considerably shorter than the 
optimal level. Of course, a more accurate analysis should be done in subsequent 
research on optimal UI reform. Second, for a fair comparison of the competing 
policies, we can also consider the two cases shown in Table 20: 1) 60% vs. a two- 
month extension, 2) 70% vs. a four-month extension given a similar increment in 
the UI premium. Again, the main massage of the paper, extensions of the maximum 
benefit duration are more desirable than increases in wage replacement rates, is 
maintained. 
The main reason why the policy change that increases wage replacement rates 
reduces social welfare is that there exists a lower limit of the UI benefit, and most 
UI recipients who receive the lower limit are not affected by this policy change. 
This result implies that the UI benefit formula in Korea appears to have room to 
improve beyond wage replacement rates and maximum benefit durations. Social 
welfare can be improved by adjusting the upper and lower limits of the UI benefits. 
In Korea, the upper limit of the UI benefit is fixed at a certain level (as of 2015, 
43,000 won), and the lower limit of the UI benefit is 90% of minimum wages. 
Table 21 shows whether the upper and lower limits of UI benefits are applied in 
major OECD member countries. Most countries except for the UK, Finland, 
Poland, and Greece set an upper limit. On the other hand, many countries, 
including the UK, Germany, and Japan, do not set a lower limit. 
 
TABLE 21—UPPER AND LOWER LIMITS OF UI BENEFITS IN MAJOR OECD COUNTRIES 
 
Upper limit 
Not set Set 
Lower limit 
Not set UK, Finland, Poland, Greece 
Japan, Germany, Austria, Canada, 
Netherlands, Norway, Czech Republic, 
Switzerland, Italy, Luxembourg  
Set  
United States, France, Denmark, Sweden, 
Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
Belgium, Iceland, Korea  
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor (2016b); OECD (2011a).  
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In view of the fact that some countries have not set upper and lower limits of UI 
benefits, I conducted additional policy experiments in which the upper and lower 
limits of UI benefits are abolished. These policy experiments will provide 
implications on methods which improve UI benefits in terms of the upper and 
lower limits. Table 22 shows the results of the policy experiments that abolish the 
upper or lower limits of UI benefits.  
When the upper limit of the UI benefits is abolished, social welfare decreases 
mainly due to a large increase in the UI premium. This result is similar to that from 
the assessment of the policy change that increases wage replacement rates. The 
policy change significantly improves welfare for a small number of UI recipients 
whose wages before job loss are relatively high, but most workers suffer welfare 
losses due to the increase in the UI premium. On the other hand, when the lower 
limit of the UI benefit is abolished, social welfare increases mainly due to a large 
decrease in the UI premium. Although the consumption smoothing effects for UI 
recipients who receive the lower limit before the policy change are reduced, a 
significant reduction in the UI premium improves the welfare of all workers who 
are currently paying or will pay the UI premium. Lastly, when both the upper and 
lower limits are abolished, social welfare decreases. The reason for the decrease in 
welfare in this case is that there is not a sufficient decrease in the UI premium, 
which plays a large role in the welfare increase when the lower limit is abolished. 
The results of the three policy experiments help to explain why most OECD 
members set an upper limit but do not set a lower limit of the UI benefit, as shown 
in Table 21. 
Based on the results of the three policy experiments, abolishing the lower limit 
of UI benefits is desirable in terms of social welfare. However, it should be noted 
that policy experiments that abolish upper or lower limits can be too extreme. 
Policy changes that adjust the levels of the upper and lower limits while 
maintaining the current system may have different outcomes. The results of the 
three policy experiments described above imply that the overall impact of a policy 
that adjusts the upper or lower limit of UI benefits on social welfare is determined 
mainly by how much the UI premium is adjusted. Therefore, for example, when the 
lower limit is reduced without being abolished, social welfare can decrease due to 
an insufficient reduction in the UI premium. An analysis of the optimal levels of 
the upper and lower limits is beyond the scope of this paper, though this issue will 
be studied in more detail in the future. 
 
TABLE 22—EFFECTS OF A POLICY CHANGE WHICH ABOLISHES UPPER AND LOWER LIMITS 
Statistics Baseline No upper limit No lower limit 
No upper & 
lower limits 
Average consumption for 20~84 1.8105 1.8100 1.8146 1.8108 
Average job search effort for 20~64  0.8385 0.8074 0.9802 0.9402 
(Employment rate for 20~64)  0.7117 0.7106 0.7155 0.7145 
UI premium for E (covered by UI)   0.0065 0.0091 0.0037 0.0062 
% change in total welfare for 20~84 (0.00) (-32.56) (large+) (-16.06) 
The number of UI recipients 0.0095 0.0123 0.0057 0.0085 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate the % changes in welfare in terms of the % change in the current 
average consumption for each group to achieve the same welfare level after the policy change (the equivalent 
variation in the current consumption). Additionally, ‘large+’ indicates that the welfare measure cannot be applied 
because the welfare gain is substantially large.  
40 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2018 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of an enhancement in 
unemployment benefits in Korea. In particular, the paper quantifies the welfare 
effects of two specific policy changes which have been frequently discussed among 
policymakers and researchers in recent years: increasing wage replacement rates by 
10%p and extending the maximum benefit duration by one month. To this end, an 
overlapping generation model which reflects the heterogeneity of the unemployed 
and the specificity of the UI system in Korea is built and calibrated to match the 
key features of the Korean labor market and the UI system. A quantitative analysis 
shows that extending the maximum benefit duration by one month improves social 
welfare, whereas increasing wage replacement rates by 10%p reduces social 
welfare. 
The policy change that increases the wage replacement rate by 10%p is applied 
only to the top 19.31% of UI recipients whose wage level is relatively high. The 
welfare of the high-wage group directly affected by the policy change increases 
while the welfare of the low-wage group not directly affected by the policy change 
decreases. In the high-wage group, the consumption smoothing effects outweigh 
the negative effects, resulting in improved welfare. On the other hand, the low- 
wage group does not benefit from the policy change, and their current or future 
burden from the increased UI premium deteriorates their welfare. Given that the 
welfare reduction in the low-wage group exceeds the welfare increase in the high- 
wage group, welfare overall is decreased.   
In contrast, the policy change that extends the maximum benefit duration by one 
month increases the welfare of the low-wage group but decreases the welfare of the 
high-wage group. Although the policy that extends the maximum benefit duration 
is applied to all recipients by rule, UI recipients who are directly affected by the 
policy will be those who exhaust their maximum benefit durations before the 
policy change, and most of them belong to the low-wage group. In the low-wage 
group, the consumption smoothing effects are greater than the negative effects, 
leading to a welfare improvement. On the other hand, the negative effects mainly 
due to the increase in the UI premium outweigh the positive consumption 
smoothing effects for the high-wage group. Because most workers in the high-
wage group would not benefit from the policy change, the consumption smoothing 
effects and moral hazard effects for this group would not be large. However, the 
negative impact of the increased UI premium applies to all workers in the high-
wage group, and thereby the welfare for the high-wage group decreases. Because 
the welfare increase for the low-wage group is greater than the welfare reduction 
for the high-wage group, the total welfare is increased.  
When analyzing the effects of the policy changes, it is confirmed that the amount 
of assets held plays an important role in determining welfare levels for the 
unemployed. If the amount of assets is sufficient large, it is probable that workers 
will be able to maintain their consumption levels if they become unemployed 
without unemployment benefits. Therefore, for those workers with a sufficient 
amount of assets, additional unemployment benefits may lead to savings rather 
than consumption while reducing job search efforts significantly. In other words, 
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the moral hazard effects are likely to be greater than the consumption smoothing 
effects for workers who have sufficient amounts of assets. This suggests that 
unemployment benefits need to be enhanced for those groups that are likely to face 
liquidity constraints in order to maximize the effects of such a policy change in UI.   
Starting with the shipbuilding industry, it is expected that unemployment will 
increase as the restructuring of the main industries of Korea, such as the steel and 
petrochemical industries, continues. Therefore, the role of UI is becoming more 
important. Furthermore, UI will play a central role in expanding the social safety 
net which is essential to improve the productivity and dynamics of the Korean 
economy. This study suggests that it is more desirable to extend maximum benefit 
durations rather than to increase wage replacement rates in terms of social welfare. 
More generally, enhancements to unemployment benefits should focus on groups 
for which amounts of assets are likely to be insufficient, such as young workers and 
socially disadvantaged groups, if possible.  
In this study, I attempted to account for the heterogeneity of the workers and the 
characteristics of the Korean UI system to the greatest extent possible. Nevertheless, 
there are certain aspects that cannot be reflected in the model due to the complexity 
of the model, the difficulty of computation, and limitations on data which are 
essential to the calibration. First, this paper does not offer a deeper reflection on 
idiosyncratic earning shocks other than unemployment risk in that it focuses on the 
roles of UI and assets for income shocks only from unemployment, and to lessen 
the computation burden. However, in future studies, it would be worthwhile to 
examine how the roles of unemployment benefits and asset holdings change when 
other income shocks such as individual productivity shocks or match quality 
shocks are included in the model. In this case, the model can reflect the extent to 
which unemployment benefits contribute to better job matching, which is another 
positive aspect of unemployment benefits in addition to consumption smoothing 
effects, as discussed in Tatsiramos (2014). Second, firms’ decisions to post 
vacancies are not explicitly considered in the model. Because firms’ endogenous 
decisions are not reflected, the job finding rates in the model depend only on the 
workers’ job search efforts. According to Hagedorn et al. (2016), more generous 
unemployment benefits can reduce a firm’s incentive to post vacancies because 
more generous unemployment benefits increase the value of outside options for 
unemployed workers and increase equilibrium wages. If this effect is found to be 
significant in Korea, this margin should be included in the model in future research. 
Lastly, if administrative data regarding unemployment benefits are available, the 
calibration of the model can become more sophisticated.  
This paper investigates only two specific policy options which can be implemented 
immediately considering the current actual situation in Korea. However, ideally it 
would be worthwhile to conduct additional studies on optimal unemployment 
benefits in Korea by reflecting the aforementioned content, and this is left as future 
research.  
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